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SHIFTING LOSSES: THE IMPACT OF FANNIE'S AND
FREDDIE'S CONSERVATORSHIPS ON COMMERCIAL
BANKS
Julie Andersen Hill*
In fall 2008, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) placed
mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in conservatorship. As con-
servator, the FHFA has control over the operations of both companies, but it
faces conflicting mandates. On the one hand, the FHFA is tasked with stabi-
lizing the secondary mortgage market and providing access to mortgage
credit. Achieving this task encourages Fannie and Freddie to absorb some
mortgage-related losses. On the other hand, the FHFA is tasked with return-
ing Fannie and Freddie to financial health. For Fannie and Freddie to re-
turn to financial health, they must minimize their losses, perhaps by passing
those losses along to commercial banks.
This Article examines how the FHFA as conservator resolves its
conflicting mandates. The Article examines the FHFA's key loss-shifting de-
cisions and the impact of those decisions on commercial banks. In particular,
it inspects: (1) the FHFA 's decision to allow Fannie and Freddie to continue
their activity in the secondary mortgage market; (2) the FHFA's decision to
allow the Department of the Treasury to recapitalize Fannie and Freddie in
a way that resulted in large losses for holders of Fannie and Freddie stock;
and (3) the FHFA 's decision to enforce Fannie's and Freddie's rights
against sellers of mortgages and private-label mortgage-backed securities.
The Article concludes that as a result of its conflicting mandates, the
FHFA has allowed Fannie and Freddie to absorb losses-particularly when
those losses would otherwise have been transferred to the large, systemically
important banks. In other instances, the FHFA has shifted Fannie and Fred-
die losses to small community banks. Such loss transfer practices have the
potential to cause undue consolidation in the banking industry and exacer-
bate the problem offinancial institutions that are too big to fail.
While such loss transfer practices may be consistent with the
FHFA's conflicting mandates, they are troubling because the FHFA's deci-
sions are often made behind closed doors with little opportunity for the pub-
lic to determine whether the FHFA is striking the right balance between its
market stabilization and loss prevention goals. This Article urges the FHFA
to adopt disclosure practices that will allow the public to evaluate the Enter-
prises' loss-shifting policies.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. I am grateful to
Michael Hill, Irma Jacobsen, and Heidi Mandanis Schooner for their helpful comments on this
Article. This Article was prepared for a symposium entitled "Reforming the Secondary Mort-
gage Market" held at the Hamline University School of Law.
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As the United States neared the tipping point of the 2008 home
mortgage crisis, Fannie Mae (Fannie) and Freddie Mac (Freddie) (collective-
ly the Enterprises) were on the brink of failure. These secondary-market
mortgage giants had come to play a critical role in housing finance. The En-
terprises encouraged liquidity in the mortgage market by purchasing mort-
gages from banks and securitizing them, creating mortgage-backed securi-
ties. Investors then bought the mortgage-backed securities with a guarantee
from Fannie or Freddie. The Enterprises also bought and held mortgage-
backed securities in their own investment portfolios.' By fall 2008, the En-
terprises owned or guaranteed more than $5 trillion in residential mortgag-
es-more than forty percent of the residential mortgage market.2 But as
housing prices collapsed and homeowners increasingly defaulted on mort-
gages, losses mounted at the Enterprises. Common stock for both Enterprises
See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO STUDY: FANNIE MAE, FREDDIE MAC, AND THE
FEDERAL ROLE IN THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET 1-2 (Dec. 2010) (describing the En-
terprises' business activities).
2 Oversight Hearing to Examine Recent Treasury and FHFA Actions Regarding
the Housing GSEs: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 100th Cong. 11 (2008)




traded at under five dollars a share,3 and both Enterprises had trouble raising
additional capital.4
Concerned that either Enterprise's failure could cripple the entire
economy, the Federal Housing Finance Agency placed Fannie and Freddie in
conservatorship.5 In addition, the United States Department of the Treasury
(Treasury) agreed to provide capital as necessary to keep the Enterprises
afloat.6
The conservatorships transformed the role of government in the En-
terprises' operations. Before the conservatorships, the Enterprises were gov-
ernment-sponsored enterprises-private companies with government charters
and tax benefits.7 The FHFA acted as their regulator.8 In conservatorship, the
FHFA acquired the expanded powers of "conservator." As conservator, the
FHFA has control of the Enterprises' boards of directors and authority to
operate the Enterprises until they are financially healthy. 9
3 Ben Levisohn, The Final Fate of Fannie and Freddie, BLOOMBERG
BUSfNESSWEEK ONLINE (Aug. 22, 2008, 12;01 AM EST), http://www.businessweek.com/
investor/content/aug2008/pi20080821_660796.htm.
4 See James R. Hagerty & Aparajita Saha-Bubna, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac Are
Pounded: Two Stocks Plunge on Growing Fears of a U.S. Bailout, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19,
2008, at A3.
5 Press Release, James B. Lockhart, Dir., Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, Statement
Announcing the Conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 5 (Sept. 7, 2008), available
at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/23/FHFAStatement9708final.pdf [hereinafter Lockhart
Statement].
6 Press Release, Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Sec'y, Dep't of the Treasury, Statement
on Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect Financial Markets and
Taxpayers (Sept. 7, 2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/hpl 129.aspx [hereinafter Paulson Statement]. Initially Treasury agreed to pro-
vide up to $100 billion in capital for each company. See Fannie Mae Amended and Restated
Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement 2.1 (Sept. 26, 2008), available at
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/1031/FNMSrPrefStockPA92608.pdf [hereinafter Fannie Mae
Senior Preferred Stock Agreement]; Freddie Mac Amended and Restated Senior Preferred
Stock Purchase Agreement 2.1 (Sept. 26, 2008), available at
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/1033/FRESrPrefStockPA92608.pdf [hereinafter Freddie Mac
Senior Preferred Stock Agreement]. Later, the $100 billion cap was eliminated. See Press
Release, Treasury Dep't, Treasury Issues Update on Status of Support for Housing Programs
(Dec. 24, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/2009122415345924543.aspx.
7 "Broadly defined, a [government-sponsored enterprise] is a corporation char-
tered by the federal government to achieve public purposes that has nongovernmental status,
is excluded from the federal budget, and is exempt from most, if not all, laws and regulations
applicable to federal agencies, officers, and employees." CONG. BUDGET OFFICE,
CONTROLLING THE RISKS OF GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES 2 (1991); see also 2
U.S.C. § 622(8) (2006) (defining "government-sponsored enterprise" for federal budgetary
purposes).
8 See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, §
1101, 122 Stat. 2654, 2661 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 4511) (creating the Federal Housing Fi-
nance Agency as a new regulator for Fannie and Freddie).
9 See Lockhart Statement, supra note 5, at 5-6; Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin.
Agency, Questions and Answers on Conservatorship 2 (Sept. 7, 2008), available at
http://www.thfa.gov/GetFile.aspx?FilelD=35 [hereinafter Q&A on Conservatorship].
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As the Enterprises' conservator, the FHFA must perform a delicate
balancing act.' ° On the one hand, the government has sometimes used the
Enterprises as tools to aid recovery of the housing market and stabilize the
economy." This sometimes requires the Enterprises to absorb losses, effec-
tively passing those losses on to the government, and eventually the Ameri-
can taxpayer. On the other hand, the FHFA, as conservator, has a duty to re-
turn the Enterprises to financial health-a task which likely includes limiting
the Enterprises' losses.'2 In order to reduce losses, the FHFA can sometimes
shift losses to other mortgage-market participants.
One potential target for absorbing the Enterprises' losses is commer-
cial banks. When the government first announced the conservatorship,
Treasury recognized that the Enterprises' conservatorships could impact
banks. However, it concluded that because banks sell mortgages to the En-
terprises, banks would benefit from the conservatorships. As then-Treasury
Secretary Henry Paulson explained, "By stabilizing [the Enterprises] so they
can better perform their mission, [the conservatorships] should accelerate
stabilization in the housing market, ultimately benefiting financial institu-
tions.'
3
Treasury's "rising tide lifts all boats' 4 explanation of the conserva-
torships is not complete. It conceives of banks as merely conduits of mort-
gages sold to the Enterprises, with the Enterprises bearing the ultimate risk
associated with the mortgages. However, the connection and allocation of
risk between banks and the Enterprises is more complex. In some instances,
banks bear some risk. For example, banks repurchased risk from the Enter-
prises by investing in the Enterprises' debt and equity securities. 5 In addi-
tion, when the Enterprises purchase mortgages or private-label mortgage-
backed securities, they acquired rights that may be enforced against the sell-
10 See Lockhart Statement, supra note 5, at 5 (stating that the purpose of the con-
servatorships was to "restore the balance between safety and soundness and mission"); see
also Bob Davis, Deborah Solomon, & John Hilsenrath, After the Bailouts, Washington's the
Boss, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 2009, at Al (noting that "the government is torn between its roles
as shareholder and guardian of the public interest").
II See Lockhart Statement, supra note 5, at 1 (describing the Enterprises' "critical
mission of roviding stability and liquidity to the housing market").
I See FED. Hous, FIN. AGENCY, REPORT TO CONGRESS 2010, at i (June 13, 2011),
available at http://www.flifa.gov/webfiles/21572/FHFA2010_RepToCongress6 13 11.pdf
[hereinafter FHFA 2010 Report to Congress] (stating that the FHFA's "obligation as conser-
vator.., requires it to minimize credit losses to the enterprises, which minimizes losses to the
government").
13 Paulson Statement, supra note 6.
14 This phrase, popularized by President John F. Kennedy, is often used to de-
scribe the idea that helping one sector of the economy will benefit others. See TED SORENSEN,
COUNSELOR: A LIFE AT TRE EDGE OF HISTORY 140 (2008).
15 See Michael Padhi, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac at Work in the Secondary
Mortgage Market, FIN. UPDATE (Fed. Reserve Bank Atlanta), Mar. 31, 2001, at 2 ("Commer-
cial banks interact extensively with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as mortgage sellers, mort-
gage servicers, and investors in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac debt securities and, to a very
limited degree, equity securities.").
[Vol. 35:343
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er, often a commercial bank.' 6 Thus, the FHFA can, in some instances, shift
losses from Fannie and Freddie to banks.
This Article first describes the Enterprises and the FHFA's authority
as conservator, including its conflicting mandates to stabilize the mortgage
industry while returning the Enterprises to financial health.17 The Article
then examines three of the FHFA's key decisions in allocating losses be-
tween the Enterprises and commercial banks. First, it inspects FHFA's deci-
sion to enable Fannie and Freddie to continue their secondary mortgage mar-
ket activities.' 8 Second, it examines FHFA's decision to allow Treasury to
recapitalize the Enterprises in a way that resulted in large losses for Enter-
prise stockholders. 19 Third, it studies the FHFA's efforts to enforce the En-
terprises' rights against sellers of mortgages and private-label mortgage-
backed securities.20
These decisions show that in some instances the government allowed
the Enterprises to absorb losses even when the losses could be transferred to
large banks. Presumably this is part of the government's larger efforts to sta-
bilize systemically important banks. On the other hand, the government al-
lowed the Enterprises to transfer some losses to small banks, even when the
losses ultimately resulted in bank failures. The FHFA has likely allowed risk
shifting to small banks in part because it determined that even if some small
banks fail, the economic impact will not be widespread. Such loss shifting
practices have the potential to cause undue consolidation in the banking in-
dustry and exacerbate the problem of financial institutions that are too big to
fail.
This Article asserts that the FHFA's loss shifting practices are par-
ticularly troubling because the FHFA's decision-making process occurs be-
hind closed doors. There is little opportunity for outside comment before the
FHFA acts. Even once the FHFA makes loss-shifting decisions, the Enter-
prises rarely release enough information for outside observers to accurately
assess any windfall transferred to large commercial banks. Government poli-
cymakers should realize their economic and housing goals through means
that are more transparent than the FHFA's decision-making process. In par-
ticular, this Article urges the FHFA to adopt disclosure practices that will
allow the public to evaluate the Enterprises' settlements of mortgage repur-
chase and private-label mortgage-backed securities claims.
16 See FANNIE MAE, SELLING GUIDE: FANNIE MAE SINGLE FAMILY § A2-2 (Jan.
27, 2011), available at https://www.efanniemae.corn/sfguides/ssg/sg/pdf/sel012711.pdf
[hereinafter FANNIE MAE SELLING GUIDE] (describing representations and warranties made by
mortgage sellers to Fannie); FREDDIE MAC, SINGLE-FAMILY SELLER/SERVICER GUIDE § 6.11
(2011), available at http://www.freddiemac.com/sell/guide/ (follow AllRegs hyperlink) [here-
inafter FREDDIE MAC SELLER GUIDE] (describing representations and warranties made by
mortgage sellers to Freddie).
'7 See infra Part I.
's See infra Part II.A.
'9 See infra Part II.B.
20 See infra Part II.C.
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II. CONSERVATORSHIP AND CONFLICTING MANDATES
Prior to the conservatorships, Fannie and Freddie were both private-
ly-owned companies that operated with public mandates to achieve afforda-
ble housing goals.21 Others have long noted that the Enterprises' hybrid sta-
tus created conflicting priorities.22 On the one hand, the Enterprises (like
most privately-owned companies) wanted to maximize shareholder value. On
the other hand, the Enterprises' government-developed affordable housing
goals focused on expanding the availability of home mortgages. As conser-
vator, the FHFA has largely inherited these conflicting priorities. This Part
first provides a brief historical description of Fannie and Freddie, including
the events leading to the conservatorships. It then examines the FHFA's re-
sponsibilities and powers as conservator.
A. The Enterprises' Conflicting Mandates
Although the federal government originally created and capitalized
the Enterprises, private capital later emerged to fund the Enterprises. 23 What
resulted were privately-owned Enterprises with duties to both their share-
holders and to the public as a whole.
Fannie began life as a government-owned company designed to in-
24crease mortgage lending during the Great Depression. At its inception,
Fannie's business model was simple: it took money from public coffers and
purchased mortgages insured by the Federal Housing Administration. 25
However, over the years, Congress authorized Fannie to purchase an increas-
ing variety of mortgages and eventually allowed Fannie to become a securiti-
zation engine for a huge portion of the mortgage market.26 Often Congress's
21 See infra Part I.A.
22 See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
23 For more complete histories of Fannie and Freddie see: FED. NAT'L MORTG.
ASS'N, BACKGROUND AND HISTORY (1973); Richard W. Bartke, Fannie Mae and the Second-
ary Mortgage Market, 66 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 16-65 (1971) (explaining the historical perspec-
tive of the Federal National Mortgage Association from its inception through the 1968 Act);
Julie Andersen Hill, Bailouts and Credit Cycles: Fannie, Freddie, and the Farm Credit Sys-
tem, 2010 Wisc. L. REv. 1, 17-23, 27-34, 49-60.
24 President Franklin D. Roosevelt authorized the government to charter a mort-
gage association known as the National Mortgage Association of Washington in 1938. See
FED. NAT'L MORTG. ASS'N, supra note 23, at 3. Shortly thereafter the Enterprise was renamed
the Federal National Mortgage Association. Id. at 2 n. 10. Today it is known as Fannie Mae.
See Karen Larsen, Miss Grammar: The Name Game, 57 OR. ST. B. BULL. 33, 33 (1997).
25 See National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479, § 301, 48 Stat. 1246, 1253
(1934) (authorizing national mortgage associations to purchase Federal-Housing-
Administration-guaranteed mortgages); FED. NAT'L MORTG. ASS'N, supra note 23, at 3; SAUL
B. KLAMAN, THE POSTWAR RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE MARKET 218 (1961).
26 Over the years, Congress repeatedly increased the types of mortgages Fannie
could purchase. See, e.g., Act of July 1, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-864, 62 Stat. 1206, 1207 (au-
thorizing Fannie to purchase mortgages insured by the Veterans Administration); Emergency
Home Finance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-351, § 201, 84 Stat. 450, 450 (authorizing Fannie
[Vol. 35:343
2012] SHIFTING LOSSES 349
decision to increase Fannie's scope of business was tied to specific public
policy goals. For example, following World War II, Congress authorized
Fannie to purchase loans guaranteed by the Veterans Administration in order
to ensure that there was adequate capital to fund mortgages for World War II
veterans. 27
However, as Fannie grew, it became an increasingly large cost for
the federal government.28 The problem came to a head in the late 1960s when
a new unified budget would have required Fannie's operations to be included
in the federal government's budget.29 Instead of reporting a much larger fed-
eral budget, President Lyndon B. Johnson urged Congress to privatize Fan-
nie.30 Fannie became a private company in 1968. 3'
Freddie's story is linked to Fannie's. Congress chartered Freddie
Mac in 197032 as a supplement to Fannie.3 3 At that time, high interest rates
and inflation threatened the affordability of home mortgages. 34 Congress
hoped a larger secondary mortgage market would alleviate these concerns.
Although Freddie was originally owned by the Federal Home Loan Banks,35
to purchase non-government guaranteed loans). In 1968,.Congress authorized Fannie to begin
securitizing mortgages. See Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-
448, § 804, 82 Stat. 476, 542. Securitization is the process of bundling assets together and then
selling securities backed by those assets. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1384 (8th ed. 2004).
27 See H.R. Rep. No. 80-2389, at 1 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2351,
2351.
28 See CHARLES M. HAAR, FEDERAL CREDIT AND PRIVATE HOUSING: THE MASS
FINANCING DILEMMA 93 (1960).
29 Bartke, supra note 23, at 31; FED. NAT'L MORTG. Ass'N, supra note 23, at 5.
30 See LYNDON B. JOHNSON, A MESSAGE ON HOUSES AND CITIES, H.R. Doc. No.
90-261 (2d Sess. 1968); Edwin L. Dale, Jr., U.S. Aides Concede Budget 'Gimmicks,' N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 12, 1968, at 1.
31 See Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 09-448, 82
Stat. 476 (authorizing the sale of Fannie Mae debentures that could be converted to common
stock); John H. Allan, Credit Markets: Fanny May Sells $250-Million Bond Offering, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept 20, 1968, at 72 (explaining that private investors purchased $250 million of Fan-
nie's debentures).
32 Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-351, §§ 301-310, 84
Stat. 450, 451-58. Freddie Mac is officially known as the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Cor-
poration.
13 See S. REP. No. 91-761, at 7 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3488,
3495.
34 See Peter M. Carozzo, Marketing the American Mortgage: The Emergency
Home Finance Act of 1970, Standardization and the Secondary Market Revolution, 39 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 765, 769 (2005).
35 See Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 § 304(a), 84 Stat. at 454 (explain-
ing that the Federal Home Loan Banks owned Freddie); Federal Home Loan Bank Act, Pub.
L. No. 72-304, §§ 2(4), 4(a), 6(c), 42 Stat. 725, 725, 726-27 (1932) (explaining that the Fed-
eral Home Loan Banks were owned by commercial banks and thrifts who borrowed from the
Federal Home Loan Banks).
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Freddie went fully public in 1989.36 Like Fannie, Freddie became an im-
portant player in the mortgage securitization market.37
As privately-owned companies, both Fannie and Freddie had duties
to their shareholders. Corporate law dictates that directors and officers owe a
duty of care and a duty of loyalty to shareholders. 31 More broadly, share-
holders generally expect that corporate directors and officers will seek to
maximize shareholder wealth.39 Fannie's and Freddie's management under-
stood that shareholders expected a return on their investments. The Enter-
prises' executives often provided indications that they were seeking to max-
imize shareholder value.40
Yet even as Fannie and Freddie sought to increase shareholder value,
they retained close ties to the federal government. Their federal charters con-
tinued to provide statutorily-defined public missions to, among other things,
"provide stability in the secondary market for residential mortgages" and
"promote access to mortgage credit throughout the Nation.' '41 To promote
access to mortgages, the government set affordable housing goals that en-
36 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L.
No. 101-73, § 731, 103 Stat. 183,432.
37 From its inception, Freddie had authority to securitize home mortgages. See
Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 § 306, 84 Stat. at 455.
'A board member's obligation to a corporation and its shareholders has two
prongs, generally characterized as the duty of care and the duty of loyalty." Norlin Corp. v.
Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2nd Cir. 1984). "The duty of care refers to the respon-
sibility of a corporate fiduciary to exercise, in the performance of his tasks, the care that a
reasonably prudent person in a similar position would use under similar circumstances." Id.
The duty of loyalty prohibits self-dealing. See id.
39 See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) ("A busi-
ness corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.");
Kelli A. Alces, Beyond the Board of Directors, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783, 796 (2011)
("Both directors and officers are supposed to be working toward the goal of shareholder
wealth maximization."); Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maxi-
mization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1423 (1993)
("Shareholder wealth maximization long has been the fundamental norm which guides U.S.
corporate decisionmakers.").
40 See FREDDIE MAC, CONTINUING PROGRESS: 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 5-6 (2005),
available at http://www.freddiemac.com/investors/ar/2005/2005annualrpt.pdf. For example,
Freddie's 2005 Annual Report had a section entitled "Building Shareholder Value." Id. The
section detailed plans to increase market share and manage credit and interest rate risk. Id.
Similarly, Fannie under the direction of Chief Executive Officer Franklin D. Raines, pursued
an aggressive goal of doubling its earnings per share. See OFFICE OF FED. Hous. ENTER.
OVERSIGHT, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL EXAMINATION OF FANNIE MAE 39-42 (May 2006). Fan-
nie's regulator later noted that "[earnings per share] goals are appropriate and are typical goals
for corporations. Improving shareholder value is one of the primary goals for any board of
directors, and increasing [earnings per share] is a recognized way to improve shareholder
value." Id. at 43. Nevertheless, the regulator concluded that Fannie went too far and engaged
in inappropriate accounting. See id. at 1-10.
I See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716(1), (4) (2006) (describing Fannie's public purpose);
Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 § 301, 84 Stat. at 451 (describing Freddie's public
purpose).
SHIFTING LOSSES
couraged Fannie and Freddie to purchase mortgages given to low- and mod-
erate-income households.42
Linked with their continuing public purpose, Fannie and Freddie en-
joyed many government benefits.4 ' They did not pay most state and local
taxes.44 Their securities were exempt from Securities and Exchange Com-
mission registration requirements. 45 They were eligible to borrow directly
from the Treasury. 46 And, their securities could be purchased by banks47 and
the Federal Reserve.48 In short, Fannie and Freddie were government-
sponsored enterprises.49 This special status allowed the Enterprises to borrow
money at lower interest rates than purely private corporations. 5°
As Fannie and Freddie grew, more and more observers noted the En-
terprises' hybrid status created conflicting goals. In 1999 and 2000 the
American Enterprise Institute published a compilation of articles entitled
Serving Two Masters, Yet Out of Control: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.5' In
particular, critics began to argue that the Enterprises' hybrid structure en-
sured that government benefits provided to Fannie and Freddie resulted in
increased value for Enterprise shareholders but few public benefits. 52 Others
argued that the Enterprises' affordable housing goals encouraged them to
take excessive risk that would eventually result in a government bailout.53
42 Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No 102-550, §
1332, 106 Stat. 3672, 3956-57; Floyd Norris, The Dilemma ofFannie & Freddie, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 8, 2008, at C1.
43 See David Reiss, The Federal Government's Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac's Obligations: Uncle Sam Will Pick Up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REV. 1019,
1053-68 (2008) (providing an in-depth examination of the Enterprises' regulatory privileges).
44 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1452(e), 1723a(c).
45 See id. §§ 1719(d), 1723(c).
41 See id. §§ 1455(c), 1719(c).
47 See id. §§ 24 (Seventh), 335(2), 1464(c).
48 See id. § 355(2).
49 See supra note 7 (defining the term "government-sponsored enterprise").
50 See, e.g., Brent W. Ambrose & Arthur Warga, Pricing Effects in Fannie Mae
Agency Bonds, 11 J. REAL EST. FIN. & EcON. 235 (1995); Wayne Passmore, The GSE Implicit
Subsidy and the Value of Government Ambiguity, 33 REAL EST. ECoN. 465 (2005).
51 Peter J. Wallison, Introduction to SERVING TWO MASTERS, YET OUT OF
CONTROL: FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC 1, 1 (Peter J. Wallison ed. 2001).
52 See Richard Scott Carnell, Federal Deposit Insurance and Federal Sponsor-
ship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: The Structure of Subsidy, in SERVING TWO MASTERS,
YET OUT OF CONTROL: FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC 56, 68-70 (Peter J. Wallison ed.
2001).
53 See, e.g., Reiss, supra note 43, at 1043 (arguing that the Enterprises' govern-
ment privileges evidence an implied federal guarantee of the Enterprises themselves); Winston
Sale, Effect of Conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on Affordable Housing, 18 J.
Affordable Hous. & Cmty. Dev. L. 287, 288 (2009) ("The conflict of interest between the
[Enterprises'] profit motives and their obligations to meet demanding affordable housing goals
set forth by the Department of Housing and Urban Development... led to business practices
that undermined the [Enterprises'] security and soundness and amplified the damage done by
the subprime lending boom.").
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Notwithstanding criticism, Fannie and Freddie became major players
in the secondary mortgage market. Because of their regulatory privileges, the
Enterprises faced little meaningful competition in the "conforming" mort-
gage securitization market.5 4 If a mortgage conformed to Fannie's and Fred-
die's requirements for securitization, 55 it was likely that the mortgage would
be securitized by Fannie or Freddie rather than one of their purely private
competitors.5 6 In addition, the Enterprises often purchased mortgage-backed
securities that other financial institutions securitized.57 These investments are
often referred to as private-label mortgage-backed securities, or private-label
securities.58 By fall 2008, the Enterprises owned or guaranteed more than $5
trillion in residential mortgages.59
Because both Fannie and Freddie were heavily invested in the mort-
gage market, they were especially hard hit when the housing market began
collapsing in 2007.60 In fall 2008, the Enterprises' regulators, the Federal
Housing Finance Agency, decided that the Enterprises both lacked adequate
54 Reiss, supra note 43, at 1032-33 (noting that "Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
can price their securities more attractively than private label issuers, and therefore have nearly
the entire prime, conforming market to themselves-a market in which they can effectively
act as duopolists").
5 Fannie and Freddie face statutory restrictions on the types of mortgages they
can purchase. For example, the Enterprises generally cannot purchase mortgages where the
amount of the mortgage exceeds eighty percent of the value of the mortgaged property. See 12
U.S.C. §§ 1454(a)(2), 1717(b)(2).
56 See Brent J. Horton, In Defense of Private-Label Mortgage-Backed Securities,
61 FLA. L. REv. 827, 860 (2009) (noting that "private-label issuers may originate conforming
mortgages, but they sell them to [Fannie and Freddie] to securitize while keeping and securit-
izing the more risky non-conforming mortgages"); Marsha Courchane et al., Industry Changes
in the Market for Mortgage Loans, 41 CONN. L. REv. 1143, 1158 (2009). By 2007, conven-
tional, conforming mortgages made up 86% of the mortgage market, and the Enterprises pur-
chased 40% of all mortgages. See id. at 1158.
57 See Christopher L. Peterson, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Home Mort-
gage Foreclosure Crisis, 10 Loy. J. PUB. INT. L. 149, 162-63 (2009). "From 2004 to 2007, no
less than 51 percent of Fannie Mae's mortgage-related securities purchases were private label,
totaling over $229 billion in purchases. Freddie Mac's investment purchases were similarly
aggressive, with an average 15 percent investment in private label securities from 2001 to
2003 jumping to an average of 48 percent from 2004 to 2007." Sale, supra note 53, at 291.
58 See W. Scott Frame, The 2008 Federal Intervention to Stabilize Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac 13 n.26 (Fed. Res. Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper No. 2009-13, Apr.
2009), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/wp0913.pdf ("Private-label
mortgage securities are those not guaranteed by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or Ginnie Mae.").
59 Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 1 l(testimony of James B. Lockhart, III,
Dir., Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency).
60 FANNIE MAE, QUARTERLY REPORT (FORM 10-Q) at 3 (Nov. 9, 2007) (reporting
a nearly $1.4 billion loss in the third quarter of 2007); FREDDIE MAC, CONSOLIDATED
STATEMENTS OF INCOME 1 (Nov. 20, 2007) (reporting an unaudited loss of $2 billion in the
third quarter of 2007); see also Sale, supra note 53, at 297 (noting that the Enterprises' ag-
gressive investments in private-label mortgage-backed securities led to losses); James R.
Hagerty, Fannie, Freddie Feel Default Heat, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2007, at A14 (reporting
that "unprecedented foreclosures and declines in home prices" led to Fannie and Freddie loss-
es).
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capital. 6' The Enterprises also faced increased borrowing costs62 that made it
difficult for them to continue securitizing new mortgages. Moreover, losses
63at the Enterprises were still increasing.
If Fannie and Freddie had been ordinary companies, they would have
failed. Instead, as scholars long predicted,64 the federal government rescued
the two companies. On September 7, 2008, the FHFA announced that it had
placed Fannie and Freddie into voluntary conservatorships.
65
B. The Conservator's Conflicting Mandates
As conservator, the FHFA has largely inherited the Enterprises con-
flicting purposes. Although the Enterprises are in conservatorship, they have
maintained the government charters and the public purpose to, among other
things, stabilize the housing markets. At the same time, a conservatorship is,
by definition, "a statutory process designed to stabilize a troubled institution
with the objective of returning the entit[y] to normal business operations.' 66
This section describes the FHFA's authority and responsibilities when acting
as conservator.
Federal law grants the FHFA broad powers when acting as conserva-
tor. Many of these powers are quintessential conservatorship powers-that
is, powers that are designed to allow the FHFA to operate the companies
67
and return them to health.68 In some ways, these powers approximate the
powers that the Enterprises exercised independently in order to increase
shareholder value prior to the conservatorships. In particular, the FHFA may:
61 See Jeffrey H. Birnbaum & Neil Irwin, Despite Lifelines, Concerns Linger on
Mortgage Giants, WASH. POST, July 15, 2008, at Dl; Charles Duhigg, Pressured to Take
More Risk, Fannie Reached Tipping Point, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2008, at Al.
62 See David Cho & Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Treasury's Vigil on Fannie, Freddie:
Paulson Watches Preferred Stock, Debt Sales for Signs of Trouble, WASH. POST, Aug. 23,
2008, at D1; Paul Muolo & Brian Collins, New Concerns On GSEs, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS,
Aug. 25, 2008, at 1.
63 See Walter Hamilton, Stocks Plummet on Oil, Credit Worries, L.A. TIMES, June
21, 2008, at 4 (reporting that Lehman Brothers forecasted increasing losses for Fannie and
Freddie).
64 See, e.g., Carrie Stradley Lavargna, Government-Sponsored Enterprises Are
"Too Big to Fail": Balancing Public and Private Interests, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 1038
(1993) (concluding that Fannie and Freddie "are clearly 'too big to fail,' as liquidating an
enterprise would significantly disrupt the nation's economy"); Reiss, supra note 43, at 1025
("The once seemingly remote possibility of a bailout has become more likely as a result of the
ongoing meltdown in the mortgage markets.").
65 Lockhart Statement, supra note 5, at 7; Q&A on Conservatorship, supra note 9,
at 1-3.
66 Lockhart Statement, supra note 5, at 5-6.
67 12 U.S.C § 4617(b)(2)(D)(ii) (West Supp. 2009) (stating that the FHFA, as
conservator, may take any action that is "appropriate to carry on the business of the regulated
entity"); see also 12 C.F.R. § 1237.3(a)(7) (2011).
68 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(D)(i) (stating that the FHFA, as conservator, may take
any actions "necessary to put the regulated entity in a sound and solvent condition"); see also
12 C.F.R. § 1237.3(a)(4).
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(i) take over the assets of and operate the regulated entity
with all the powers of the shareholders, the directors, and the
officers of the regulated entity and conduct all business of
the regulated entity;
(ii) collect all obligations and money due the regulated enti-
ty;
(iii) perform all functions of the regulated entity in the name
of the regulated entity which are consistent with the ap-
pointment as conservator or receiver;
(iv) preserve and conserve the assets and property of the
regulated entity; and
(v) provide by contract for assistance in fulfilling any func-
tion, activity, action, or duty of the Agency as conservator or
receiver.69
The FHFA can "transfer or sell any asset or liability of the regulated entity in
default" and can "pay all valid obligations of the regulated entity. '7° In addi-
tion, the FHFA as conservator can also "repudiate or disaffirm any contract
or lease to which [Fannie or Freddie] is a party. ' 71 Finally, the FHFA has
subpoena and "incidental powers" that are necessary to carry out its above
enumerated powers.72 It is authorized to take any action that it "determines is
in the best interest of the regulated entity. ' 73
While the conservatorship statute focuses primarily on the conserva-
tor's duty to return Fannie and Freddie to health, regulations make it clear
that the FHFA should continue to consider the public mission that both com-
panies held before conservatorship.74 According to regulations, the FHFA
may "[c]ontinue the missions of the regulated entity [and e]nsure that the
operations and activities of each regulated entity foster liquid, efficient,
competitive, and resilient national housing finance markets."
75
During the financial strain of the Great Recession, it is difficult for
the FHFA to ensure that the Enterprises fully achieve both the mission of
stabilizing the mortgage market and the mission of returning to financial
health. Fannie and Freddie, like other mortgage-market participants, tend to
fund mortgages in a pro-cyclical manner. When the economy is good, the
69 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(B); see also 12 C.F.R. § 1237.3(a)(1), (5)-(8).
70 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(G), (H);see also 12 C.F.R. §§ 1237.3(d), 1237.6.
71 12 C.F.R. § 1237.5 (noting that the power must be exercised within "18 months
following the appointment of a conservator").
72 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(I), (J).
13 Id. § 4617(b)(2)(J).
74 When the FHFA proposed the applicable rules, it reasoned that the conserva-
torship consideration of the public mission of Fannie and Freddie was warranted because the
companies "continue to operate under their charters." Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Con-
servatorship and Receivership, 75 Fed. Reg. 39,462, 39,465 (proposed July 9, 2010). These
charters specify that Fannie and Freddie should help stabilize the secondary mortgage market
and improve access to mortgage credit. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
75 12 C.F.R. § 1237.3(a)(2), (3).
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Enterprises can use private investment to purchase mortgages.76 When the
economy is bad, private sources of investment dry up, the value of the Enter-
prises' investment portfolios decline, and the Enterprises restrict their in-
vestment. 77 For Fannie and Freddie to continue their public missions by pur-
chasing mortgages during an economic downturn, the Enterprises must be
78able to acquire capital from and shift losses to the government.
On the other hand, the Enterprises cannot be considered financially
healthy if they must acquire capital from and shift losses to the government
in order to stay afloat. Progress away from reliance on government assistance
will require that the Enterprises earn profits, minimize credit losses, and re-
strict mortgages purchased.79
However, efforts to reduce losses or restrict mortgage purchases
could run counter to the Enterprises' public missions. In an effort to reduce
the Enterprises' losses, the FHFA might adopt policies that shift losses to
other mortgage-market participants, especially banks. If other mortgage-
market participants are unable to bear those losses, the mortgage market will
be destabilized. Similarly, if Fannie and Freddie restrict their mortgage pur-
chases, mortgages will be less available. In other words, "the FHFA is stuck
between the narrow needs of Fannie and Freddie and the broader needs of the
housing market.,
80
III. LOSS SHIFTING: A BALANCING ACT
According to the FHFA, one purpose of the conservatorship is to
"restore the balance between safety and soundness and mission. This sec-
tion explores how the FHFA as conservator has balanced its competing man-
dates when influencing policy decisions82 at the Enterprises. In particular, it
76 See Hill, supra note 23, at 27-34, 66-67.
77 See id. at 51-55, 66-67.
78 See id. at 67-68.
79 See FHFA 2010 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 12, at i (describing FHFA
policies to limit Enterprise losses).
80 Brad Plumer & Ezra Klein, An Unlikely Powerhouse in Housing Policy, WASH.
POST, Aug. 31, 2011, at A14.
81 Lockhart Statement, supra note 5, at 5.
82 As the Enterprises' conservator, the FHFA's most visible exercise of power has
been its appointment of top-level management to oversee major policy decisions. One of its
first acts as conservator was to replace the chief executive officers at both Enterprises. Id.;
James R. Hagerty et al., U.S. Seizes Mortgage Giants: Government Ousts CEOs of Fannie,
Freddie: Promises Up to $200 Billion in Capital, Wall St. J., Sept. 8, 2008, at Al. In subse-
quent months, the FHFA also replaced members of the boards of directors and developed new
board committee structures. FED. Hous. FIN. AGENCY, REPORT TO CONGRESS 2008, at 80 (May
18, 2009), available at http://www.hfa.gov/webfiles/2331/FHFAReportToCongress
2008final.pdf [hereinafter FHFA 2008 REPORT TO CONGRESS]. With these executives in place,
the FHFA delegated the task of operating Fannie and Freddie to the companies' boards of
directors, managers, and employees. See Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, Office of Conservatorship
Operations, http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=344 (last visited Mar. 27, 2012) ("While
the FHFA has very broad authority, the focus of the conservatorships is not to manage every
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considers three instances in which the FHFA has been faced with the deci-
sion of whether to allow Fannie and Freddie to absorb losses or to attempt to
shift losses to commercial banks. First, it examines the FHFA's decisions
that allow the Enterprises to continue their activities in the secondary mort-
gage market.8 3 Next, it examines the FHFA's decision to allow the Treasury
to purchase senior preferred stock in Fannie and Freddie. 84 The decision pre-
served value for bondholders, but harmed banks that had invested in the
companies' common and preferred stock. Finally, this Part examines the
FHFA's attempts to limit credit losses by transferring losses back to banks
that sold mortgages or private-label securities to the Enterprises. 5
A. Continued Securitization
When the FHFA announced the Enterprises' conservatorships, gov-
ernment officials explained that the conservatorships would aid commercial
banks by continuing the Enterprises' purchases of mortgages and mortgage-
backed securities in the secondary market. Then-Treasury Secretary Henry
Paulson explained that "[b]y stabilizing [Fannie and Freddie] so they can
better perform their mission, [the conservatorships] should accelerate stabili-
zation in the housing market, ultimately benefiting financial institutions. 8 6
The FHFA Director explained that the Enterprises would "be allowed to
grow their guarantee [mortgage-backed securities] books without limits and
continue to purchase replacement securities for their portfolios, about $20
billion per month without capital constraints. 8 ' To make new mortgage pur-
chases, the Enterprises needed access to additional funding.8 8 The FHFA en-
hanced the Enterprises' ability to issue debt by entering into agreements with
Treasury, whereby Treasury would provide the Enterprises additional capital
aspect of the Enterprises' operations. Instead, under conservatorship, FHFA is responsible for
the overall management of the Enterprises and has delegated many operational and other du-
ties to the Enterprises' management and boards.").
Less visible is the FHFA's control over major policy decisions at Fannie and Fred-
die. The Enterprises "must consult with, and obtain approval from, FHFA, as conservator, on
critical matters." Id. The Director of the FHFA "meets weekly with the chief executives of
Fannie and Freddie and signs off on everything from major lending rules to public appearanc-
es by their executives." Nick Timiraos, An Accidental Housing Chief Embraces the Power of
'No', Wall St. J., Aug. 31, 2011, at Al; see also FHFA 2010 Report to Congress, supra note
12, at 2 ("FHFA works with the executive management of the Enterprises and their boards
regularly, attending board of directors meetings, committee meetings, and weekly senior ex-
ecutive meetings at the Enterprises."). This Article focuses primarily on how the FHFA
weighs its conflicting priorities in reaching its policy decisions.
83 See infra Part II.A.
84 See infra Part II.B.
85 See infra Part II.C.
86 Paulson Statement, supra note 6.
87 Lockhart Statement, supra note 5, at 7.
88 See id. at 5 (noting the Enterprises' inability to "fund themselves according to
normal practices and prices").
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if they became insolvent.89 In addition, Treasury and the Federal Reserve
have purchased the Enterprises' debt and mortgage-backed securities. 90
In the first few months of the conservatorships, the FHFA suggested
that, consistent with efforts to stabilize the housing markets, the Enterprises
would make it easier and less costly for banks to sell mortgages to the Enter-
prises. The FHFA hinted that it would instruct Fannie and Freddie to loosen
underwriting criteria to make it possible for the Enterprises to securitize
more mortgages. 91 The FHFA also encouraged the Enterprises to abandon
plans to increase the guarantee fees paid by banks that sold loans to the En-
terprises.92 Guarantee fees are the fees that the enterprises charge mortgage
originators who sell mortgages to the Enterprises.93 These fees are designed
to compensate the Enterprises for guaranteeing payments on mortgage-
backed securities issued by the Enterprises. 94 Fannie and Freddie inde-
pendently set their guarantee fees using their proprietary risk models. 9s Con-
sistent with FHFA statements, Freddie decreased its guarantee fees slightly.96
Soon, however, the FHFA indicated that it expected the Enterprises
to reduce their role in the secondary mortgage market over time in order to
stabilize the financial condition of the Enterprises. Agreements that Fannie
and Freddie entered with Treasury at the FHFA's direction provide that the
Enterprises' retained mortgage portfolio could not exceed $850 billion each
at the end of 2009. 9' Thereafter, Fannie and Freddie must shrink their re-
tained mortgage portfolios by ten percent per year until each portfolio reach-
es $250 billion.98
89 See infra notes 119-125 and accompanying text. Part 1I.B discusses the impact
of this investment on banks that invested in the Enterprises' stock.
90 See James Lockhart, Open Forum: The Present and Future of the GSEs, NAT'L
MORTGAGE NEWS, June 22, 2009, at 4.
91 Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: Recent Actions Regarding Government Spon-
sored Entities, Investment Banks and Other Financial Institutions: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 100th Cong. 117-18, 123(2008) (statement of
James B. Lockhart, Ii, Dir., Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency) (indicating that "Freddie Mac and Fan-
nie Mae, in order to try to build capital, may have raised prices and tightened credit standards
beyond what was necessary for sound underwriting" and reporting that the FHFA was exam-
ining the companies' "underwriting standards and pricing").
92 See Harris Terris, Fannie and Freddie Say Fees Won't Rise After All, AM.
BANKER, Oct. 6, 2008, at 10.
93 See FED. Hous. FIN. AGENCY, FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC SINGLE-FAMILY
GUARANTEE FEES IN 2008 AND 2009 at 10 (July 2010), available at http://www.flifa.gov/ web-
files/1 5918/ [hereinafter FHFA, SINGLE-FAMILY GUARANTEE FEES].
94 See id. Guarantee fees have two parts, an upfront fee and ongoing monthly
payments. Id.
95 See id. at 13-15 (stating that "Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac consider many fac-
tors in determining the guarantee fees they charge").
96 See Allison Bisbey Coiter et al., Pipeline, AM. BANKER, Jan. 1, 2009, at 8.
97 See Fannie Mae Senior Preferred Stock Agreement, supra note 6, 5.7; Fred-
die Mac Senior Preferred Stock Agreement, supra note 6, at 5.7.
98 Fannie Mae Senior Preferred Stock Agreement, supra note 6, 5.7; Freddie
Mac Senior Preferred Stock Agreement, supra note 6, 5.7.
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Next, the FHFA began actively encouraging Fannie and Freddie to
tighten underwriting standards. 99 In response, the Enterprises largely elimi-
nated their purchase of "no-income documentation [and] interest only mort-
gages."' 00 "[C]redit scores of mortgages guaranteed [by the Enterprises] in
2006-2007 averaged around 715, while [in 2009] they average[d] around
750. '' The FHFA also lowered the Enterprises' affordable housing goals.
10 2
At the same time, the FHFA allowed Fannie and Freddie to increase
guarantee-fee pricing. 0 3 In 2009, both Enterprises increased upfront fees to
adjust for the increased credit risk caused by troubled real estate and mort-
gage markets.'°4 The FHFA may allow Fannie and Freddie to implement fur-
ther guarantee-fee increases in the future.'0°
Notwithstanding more restrictive underwriting and higher pricing
policies, the Enterprises' new business acquisitions continue to approximate
seventy percent of all single-family mortgage originations. 0 6 The Enterpris-
es' continued presence in the secondary mortgage market has undoubtedly
benefited banks. As Fannie explains, "[a]s other sources of liquidity have left
the market, Fannie Mae has continued to buy or securitize mortgage loans
originated by credit unions, community banks, commercial banks and other
99 See FED. Hous. FIN. AGENCY, REPORT TO CONGRESS 2009, at v (May 25, 2010),
available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/15784/FHFAReportToCongress52510.pdf [herein-
after FHFA 2009 REPORT TO CONGRESS] ("Since the Enterprises were placed into conserva-
torship, in accordance with guidance provided by FHFA to ensure conservation of assets and
minimization of future loss, the Enterprises have tightened their underwriting standards.").
10o FHFA 2010 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 12, at iv.
10' FHFA 2009 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 99, at v ("Average loan-to-value
(LTV) ratios.., also decreased by about 5 percentage points in the postconservatorship time
period (and 89 percent of new mortgages had an LTV of 80 percent or less in 2009, as com-
pared to 76 percent of new mortgages with LTV ratios of 80 percent or less in 2007).").
102 See 2010-2011 Enterprise Housing Goals; Enterprise Book-Entry Procedures,
75 Fed. Reg. 55,892, 55,892-939 (Sept. 14, 2010) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 1249, 1282);
FHFA 2010 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 12, at 97 (explaining that the new goals contain
a "look back" procedure whereby the Enterprises can fall short of benchmark levels but still
satisfy housing goals if their "performance equals or exceeds the corresponding share of mort-
gages originated in the primary mortgage market, as based on FHFA's analysis of [Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act] data").
103 FHFA 2009 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 99, at v.
104 See id. at 18-19; Colter et al., supra note 96, at 8.
105 See Zachary A. Golfarb, Fighting for Fannie, Freddie, WASH. POST, Feb. 10,
2011, at A12 (stating that "[t]he administration will propose baby steps toward reducing gov-
ernment support [for the Enterprises], such as raising fees that Fannie and Freddie charge
lenders and borrowers for the government guarantee").
106 The Enterprises' market share was 37% in 2006, 54% in 2007, 73% in 2008,
76% in 2009, and 70% in 2010. See FHFA 2008 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 82, at ii,
18; FHFA 2009 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 99, at v; FHFA 2010 REPORT TO CONGRESS,
supra note 12, at 3.
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institutions. ' '107 This liquidity has likely slowed the downward trend in hous-
ing prices, helping the economy, banks, and consumers generally.'08
More specifically, the Enterprises' continued activity in the second-
ary market allows banks to offer loans by continuing to purchase those loans.
Fannie purchases mortgages from more than 1,000 lenders, including both
large and small financial institutions.'0 9 Likewise, Freddie acquires loans
from a variety of lenders, including "mortgage banking companies, commer-
cial banks, savings banks, community banks, credit unions, [housing finance
agencies], and savings and loan associations."
' 10
While both large banks and small banks sell mortgages to the Enter-
prises, large banks have benefitted the most. "The top 10 mortgage players-
including Wells Fargo, Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase and Citigroup-
together control 90 percent of all originations and servicing.""' The Enter-
prises' purchases come heavily from this group of large banks."' Communi-
ty banks, on the other hand, are less active in the residential mortgage mar-
ket. "Nationally, approximately 4,000 small banks made 100 or fewer mort-
gages in 2007."'1" When community banks do offer mortgages they often
prefer to hold at least a portion of their originated mortgages rather than sell
them for securitization.' 4 This means that "the absence of a securitization
107 FANNIE MAE, HELPING HOUSING RECOVER: A REPORT ON FANNIE MAE'S
MISSION PERFORMANCE 2 (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.fanniemae.com/media/
pdf/2010/mission-performance-report.pdf.
108 See Andrea J. Boyack, Laudable Goals and Unintended Consequences: The
Role and Control of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 60 AM. U. L. REv. 1489, 1526 (2011)
("Rescuing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 2008 was necessary to keep the residential mort-
gage market machinery from grinding to a halt and to mitigate the impact of the crash on
homeowners and homebuyers.").
109 See FANNIE MAE, supra note 107, at 4.
Il0 Fed. Home Loan Mort. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 12 (Mar. 9, 2012).
1 John Engen, Response Time, AM. BANKER MAG., Aug. 2011, at 18, 20.
112 See Fed. Home Loan Mort. Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 49 (Aug. 8,
2011) ("We acquire a significant portion of our single-family mortgage purchase volume from
several large lenders, or seller/servicers. Our top 10 single-family seller/servicers provided
approximately 85% of our single-family purchase volume during the six months ended June
30, 2011."); Fed. Nat'l Mort. Ass'n., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 81 (Aug. 5, 2011) ("Our
business with our mortgage seller/servicers is concentrated. Our ten largest single-family
mortgage servicers, including their affiliates, serviced 76% of our single family guaranty book
of business as of June 30, 2011 .... ").
113 The Effect of Dodd-Frank on Small Financial Institutions and Small Business:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin.
Servcs., 112th Cong. 170 (2011) (written testimony of Peter Skillern, Exec. Dir., Cmty. Rein-
vestment Ass'n of N.C.). Likewise, credit unions tend to sell fewer mortgages to the Enter-
prises. The Credit Union National Association, a trade group, "estimates that its members sold
between 25 and 40 percent of their loans before the financial crisis." Danielle Douglas, Com-
munity Banks and Credit Unions Brace for End of Fannie, Freddie, WASH. POST., Feb. 13,
2012, at A13. While credit unions have increased their sales to the Enterprises in recent years,
they still sell far fewer loans than the largest banks. See id.
114 See Engin, supra note 11, at 21, 23 (explaining that it is often profitable for
community banks to hold non-conforming loans); CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, NOVEMBER
OVERSIGHT REPORT: EXAMINING THE CONSEQUENCES OF MORTGAGE IRREGULARITIES FOR
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market is less limiting to [community banks] than it is to the big institu-
tions.11 5
Increases in the Enterprises' guarantee fees could also impact com-
munity banks more than their larger rivals. Under both Enterprises' guaran-
tee-fee pricing structures, "lenders that sell smaller volumes of single-family
mortgages to the Enterprises tend to pay higher guarantee fees on loans of
similar credit quality."'1t 6 The Enterprises explicitly consider the number of
mortgages sold by a bank in setting the guarantee fee "because the larger a
seller's delivery volume, the more the Enterprise's business with that seller
contributes to the liquidity that supports the demand for the Enterprise's out-
standing [mortgage-backed securities], which benefits all lenders that do
business with the Enterprise."'1 17 In addition, "the largest sellers have
achieved a degree of influence that can be used to negotiate better terms of
business."' 18 With guarantee fees already heavily influenced by the number
of mortgages sold, it is reasonable to suspect that increases in guarantee fees
would be structured to impact smaller banks more than the influence-
wielding larger banks.
In sum, the FHFA's decision to allow Fannie and Freddie to contin-
ue their activities in the secondary mortgage market has benefitted most
banks, including banks that sell few, if any, mortgages to the Enterprises.
However, because a small number of large banks provide the bulk of the
mortgages purchased by the Enterprises, these large banks have likely bene-
fitted the most from the Enterprises' continued purchases. In addition, the
FHFA's efforts to decrease the Enterprises' market share by increasing guar-
antee fees could potentially harm smaller banks more than the largest banks
because the largest banks have the influence to negotiate favorable pricing
terms.
B. Recapitalization
The FHFA's next major decision impacting banks was its decision
concerning the structure of new outside investment in the Enterprises. When
the FHFA announced the conservatorships, Treasury also announced that it
would provide capital for the Enterprises if they became insolvent." 9 The
method by which Treasury would invest in the companies was set by con-
FINANCIAL STABILITY AND FORECLOSURE MITIGATION 51 (Nov. 16, 2010) ("Generally, small
community banks, as well as credit unions, are more likely to keep mortgage loans on their
books as opposed to selling them in the secondary market.").
1Id. at 21. Of course, if the Enterprises' securitization efforts were instead per-
formed by the largest financial institutions, the large financial institutions might squeeze
smaller banks and credit unions from the mortgage market. See Douglas, supra note 113, at
A13.
116 FHFA, SINGLE-FAMILY GUARANTEE FEES, supra note 93, at 8.
"' Id. at 34.
118 Id.
119 Paulson Statement, supra note 6.
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tracts, with the FHFA acting on behalf of Fannie and Freddie. 20 Under the
terms of the contracts, if either Fannie or Freddie became insolvent, Treasury
would purchase senior preferred shares of the insolvent Enterprise.' 2' In ex-
change for this promise of future assistance, each Enterprise gave Treasury
$1 billion in senior preferred shares 2 2 and warrants for the purchase of
common stock representing a 79.9% interest in each company at a nominal
price. 23 Within months of conservatorship, both Fannie and Freddie an-
nounced they were insolvent and needed government capital. 24 To date, the
government has invested roughly $111.6 billion in Fannie and $71.2 billion
in Freddie.
125
The FHFA's decision to allow Treasury to purchase preferred stock
protected the investments of those who have previously bought Fannie and
Freddie debt and mortgage-backed securities. 26 With constant access to gov-
ernment capital, the Enterprises' debts became essentially guaranteed by the
federal government. Those protected debt holders included a significant
number of central banks and foreign investors. 27 However, domestic com-
mercial banks also held a large amount of the Enterprises' debt and mort-
gage-backed securities. 28 While it is unclear which banks held the bulk of
120 Id.
121 See Fannie Mae Senior Preferred Stock Agreement, supra note 6, 2.1; Fannie
Mae Second Amendment to Amended and Restated Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agree-
ment (Dec. 24, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-
stability/programs/housing-programs/mha/Documents/Fannie.pdf; Freddie Mac Senior Pre-
ferred Stock Agreement, supra note 6, 2.1; Freddie Mac Second Amendment to Amended
and Restated Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement (Dec. 24, 2009), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/programs/housing-
programs/mha/Documents/Freddie.pdf.
122 Fannie Mae Senior Preferred Stock Agreement, supra note 6, 3.1; Freddie
Mac Senior Preferred Stock Agreement, supra note 6, 3.1.
123 Federal National Mortgage Association Warrant to Purchase Common Stock
(Sept. 7, 2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/
warrantfnm3.pdf; Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Warrant to Purchase Common
Stock (Sept. 7, 2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Documents/warrantfrec.pdf.
124 See James R. Hagerty & Aparajita Saha-Bubna, Freddie Needs $13.8 Billion as
Mortgage Defaults Worsen, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2008, at A3.
125 FED. Hous. FIN. AGENCY, CONSERVATOR'S REPORT ON THE ENTERPRISES'
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE, THIRD QUARTER 2011, at 9, available at http://www.fhfa.gov/ web-
files/22855/Conservator'sReport3Q201 1 F 122111 F.pdf.
126 See Dale Arthur Oesterle, The Collapse of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Vic-
tims or Villains? 5 ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L. REv. 733, 744 (2010).
127 See Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Govern-
ment's Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REv. 463, 488--89 (2009); Craig Kar-
min, Small Fannie, Freddie Holder Take Issue With Washington, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2008,
at C1 ("The bailout proved a boon for Fannie and Freddie bond prices, which have rallied on
news of the government's support. These bonds are widely held by central banks and other
foreign investors, and their pressure on the U.S. Treasury was instrumental in promoting the
government action, people familiar with the matter say.").
128 James B. Lockhart III, Dir., Office of Fed. Hous. Enter. Oversight, GSE Re-
form Critical to Reducing Risks, Speech Before the New York Bankers Association Annual
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these securities, 129 it is likely that the largest banks had significant holdings.
Large banks often received Enterprise mortgage-backed securities when they
sold mortgages to the Enterprises,' 3" and large banks sold the Enterprises a
substantial part of the Enterprises' mortgage portfolios.'131
At the same time, Treasury's large investment in senior preferred
stock made existing investments in the Enterprises' common and preferred
stock nearly worthless. The issuance of new shares diluted existing shares.
Under the terms of the stock purchase agreements no dividend can be paid on
equity securities without Treasury's consent. 132 Conservatorship even pre-
vents stockholders from exercising any voting rights. 33 One of Freddie's
directors has gone so far as to state that he has no legal duty to consider the
concerns of Freddie's non-government shareholders. 3 4 Unsurprisingly, after
entering conservatorship, both Enterprises' common and preferred stock
shares fell below $1 per share and the Enterprises' were delisted from the
New York Stock Exchange.
35
More than a quarter of U.S. banks held Fannie or Freddie stock.
136
Indeed bank capital regulations had encouraged banks to purchase Enterprise
Convention (Nov. 9, 2006), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/1419/ NYBank-
ersl 1906.pdf ("As of year-end 2005, over 60 percent of banks held Enterprise debt and MBS
worth over 50 percent of those banks' Tier 1 capital."); VIRAL ACHARYA ET AL., FANNIE MAE,
FREDDIE MAC AND THE DEBACLE OF MORTGAGE FINANCE 52-53 (2011) (noting that FDIC
insured banks held 17% of outstanding Enterprise debt and $852 billion in Enterprise mort-
gage-backed securities).
129 See ACHARYA ET AL., supra note 128, at 58 (stating that "the problem was that
no one knew which institutions were exposed to the 17% of Fannie and Freddie's debt").
130 See FHFA, SINGLE-FAMILY GUARANTEE FEES, supra note 93, at 10 (explaining
that while "[s]ome lenders sell single-family mortgages outright to the Enterprises for cash...
[I]arger lenders primarily swap loans for [mortgage-backed securities]").
131 See supra notes 111-113 and accompanying text.
132 See Fannie Mae Senior Preferred Stock Agreement, supra note 6, 5.1; Fred-
die Mac Senior Preferred Stock Agreement, supra note 6, 5.1.
131 See 12 U.S.C.A. § 4617(b)(2)(A)(i) (West 2012) (noting that the FHFA "shall,
as conservator ... immediately succeed to ... all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the
regulated entity, and of any stockholder, officer, or director of such regulated entity with re-
spect to the regulated entity and the assets of the regulated entity").
134 Michael J. de la Merced, Freddie Official Says He Has No Duty to Sharehold-
ers, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, Feb. 9, 2011, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/02/09/freddie-
director-no-fiduciary-duty-to-shareholders/ (reporting a CNBC interview of Clayton S. Rose,
Dir., Freddie Mac).
135 See Nick Timiraos, Fannie, Freddie to Delist from NYSE, WALL ST. J., June
17, 2010, at C3 (reporting that Fannie and Freddie elected to delist after their stock share fell
below the required $1 level).
136 See John Hechinger, The Financial Crisis: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac Takeo-
vers Cost U.S. Banks Billions, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2008, at A4 (reporting that an American
Bankers Association survey found that 27% of the nation's banks held Fannie or Freddie pre-
ferred stock). Professor Dale Oesterle has criticized the government's decision to protect the
Enterprises' debt holders while not protecting the Enterprises' preferred stock holders. Oes-
terle, supra note 126, at 747. He maintains that the structure of investment means that "the
Chinese government and German banks get the benefit of taxpayer dollars and [U.S.] retirees
and local banks do not." Id.
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stock. While banks are not ordinarily allowed to invest in equity securities,
federal law created a special exception that allowed banks to invest in the
Enterprises.'3 In addition, capital regulations treated Enterprise stock favor-
ably-more favorably even than mortgages. 138 These benefits, combined
with regular dividend payments, made Fannie and Freddie preferred stock
especially popular with banks.
3 9
Treasury's decision to take Fannie and Freddie senior preferred stock
cut off stock dividends to banks and forced banks to realize losses as the
stock dropped in value. The reduced income, combined with the loss in val-
ue, had the potential to cause capital concerns for banks that held the
stock. 40 Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson recognized the concern but con-
cluded it would not pose a significant burden for many banks. He explained
that, "the agencies believe that, while many institutions hold common or pre-
ferred shares of [the Enterprises], only a limited number of smaller institu-
tions have holdings that are significant compared to their capital.'' Secre-
tary Paulson's assessment that the burden of stock losses would fall primarily
on smaller community banks was correct. Of those holding preferred stock,
85% were community banks with less than $1 billion in assets. 142 "According
to the Independent Community Bankers of America, small banks lost $16
billion because of the government takeover [of Fannie and Freddie]."
The banking industry sought legislative and regulatory help to mini-
mize the impact of Fannie and Freddie stock losses.' 44 These efforts yielded
137 See RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER,
THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 132-34 (4th ed. 2009) (explaining that
banks cannot generally invest in equity securities for their own account); 12 U.S.C. §§
24(Seventh), 1718(d) (allowing bank investment in Fannie and Freddie stock).
138 In general, a bank must have capital equal to 10% of all risk-weighted assets.
See 12 C.F.R. §§ 6.4, 208.43, 325.3, 325.103 (2009) (requiring 10% risk-weighted capital to
be classified as well-capitalized). Fannie and Freddie stock is risk-weighted at 20% of its ac-
tual value. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, App. A; 12 C.F.R. pt. 208, App. A; 12 C.F.R. pt. 325, App. A.
This means that for every $100 held in Fannie or Freddie stock, a bank would need to main-
tain only $2 in capital ($100*20% (risk-weight)*10% (capital requirement) = $2). In compari-
son, first mortgages on single-family homes have a 50% risk-weight, requiring more than
twice as much capital. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, App. A; 12 C.F.R. pt. 208, App. A; 12 C.F.R. pt.
325, App. A. For a further discussion of capital calculation, see Julie Andersen Hill, Bank
Capital Regulation by Enforcement: An Empirical Study, 87 IND. L.J. 645,650-56 (2012).
139 See Paul Gores, Three Banks Get FDIC Warnings Federal Agency Scrutinizes
Practices of Institutions, MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, Aug. 29, 2009, at B6 (noting that
"[m]any banks.., invested in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac preferred stock, which was con-
sidered financially solid and paid dividends of more than 8%").
140 Hagerty et al., supra note 82, at Al.
141 Paulson Statement, supra note 6.
142 Hechinger, supra note 136, at A4.
143 Jeff Blumenthal, Big Banks Paid Back TARP Money, Not So the Smaller Ones,
PHILADELPHIA Bus. J., Aug. 12, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 16025654.
144 See, e.g., Letter from the Independent Community Bankers of America to
Christopher Dodd and Richard Shelby (Sept. 15, 2008), available at
http://www.icba.org/files/ICBASites/PDFs/letter091508.pdf; Memorandum from the Inde-
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two provisions in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. First,
banks were allowed to treat losses on the Enterprises' stock as ordinary loss-
es rather than capital losses) 45 These ordinary losses could be used to offset
income, rather than to simply offset capital gains. 46 This provision was im-
portant because few small banks had significant capital gains against which
to deduct a capital loss. 147 Second, the Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act provided that in awarding banks funds from the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP), Treasury should give special TARP consideration to
community banks (banks with less than $1 billion in assets) hard hit by Fan-
nie and Freddie stock losses.' 48 Some banks, like Midwest Banc Holding Inc.
(a bank holding company with $3.6 billion in assets), received TARP assis-
tance quickly. 149 Treasury, however, was slow to provide TARP assistance to
many small banks. Small banks organized as S corporations 5° could not
even apply for TARP money until February 13, 2009, about four months af-
pendent Community Bankers of America to President-Elect Obama's Treasury Transition
Team (Dec. 15, 2008), available at 2008 WLNR 24059761.
145 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 301,
122 Stat. 3765, 3802-03 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5261).
146 See 26 U.S.C. § 1211 (a) (2006) ("In the case of a corporation, losses from sales
or exchanges of capital assets shall be allowed only to the extent of gains from such sales or
exchanges.").
147 See Cheryl Block, Measuring the True Cost of Government Bailout, 88 WASH.
U. L. REv. 149, 210-11 (2010) (explaining that although normally "a corporation with no
capital gains cannot deduct capital losses from its ordinary income" the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 allowed banks to deduct losses on Fannie and Freddie preferred
stock from ordinary income); John Hechinger, Small Banks Hobbled by Fannie, Freddie-
Rivals Take Over After Capital is Hit by Big Stock Losses, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 29, 2008, at CI
(reporting that "few community banks have meaningful capital gains to report").
148 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 §103(6), 122 Stat. at 3770
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5213) ("In exercising the authorities granted in this Act, the [Treas-
ury] Secretary shall take into consideration ... providing financial assistance to financial insti-
tutions, including those serving low- and moderate-income populations and other underserved
communities, and that have assets less than $1,000,000,000 that were well or adequately capi-
talized as of June 30, 2008, and that as a result of the devaluation of the preferred government-
sponsored enterprise stock will drop one or more capital levels, in a manner sufficient to re-
store the financial institutions to at least an adequately capitalized level ....")
149 See Robert Barba, Crushed by GSEs, Saved by Tarp Funds, AM. BANKER, Nov.
4, 2008, at 1 (discussing TARP Funds provided to Midwest Banc Holding Inc.); see also
Richard Newman, Regional Banks Join Bailout; $330Mlnfusion for Valley National, RECORD
(BERGEN COUNTY, N.J.), Oct. 28, 2008, at BO (describing TARP funds provided to "Valley
National Bankcorp, the largest New Jersey-based commercial bank); Neil H. Simon, Banks
Use TARP Funds Variously: In Va., Bailout Money Has Funded Acquisitions and 'Plain Va-
nilla'Loans, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 8, 2009, at DI (reporting that Central Virginia
Bankshares received $11.4 million in TARP after losing $17.8 million in Fannie and Freddie
preferred stock).
150 An S corporation is a business that has elected to have its income "taxed
through its shareholders rather than through the corporation itself." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1384 (8th ed. 2004); see also 26 U.S.C.A. § 1361(b)(2) (West 2012) (allowing banks to elect
subchapter S tax treatment unless they use the "reserve method of accounting for bad debts").
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ter the program was announced.1 5 In addition, not all small banks with sig-
nificant Fannie and Freddie losses were granted TARP money. The small
Madisonville State Bank, North Houston Bank, and National Bank of Com-
merce all applied for TARP money following losses on Enterprise stock, but
they were denied TARP funds. 52 Perhaps these banks were denied TARP
funds because Treasury officials imposed stricter qualifications for TARP
recipients as the program progressed.
Banks also sought more far-reaching assistance, but these requests
went unheeded. For example, banks have been unsuccessful in convincing
the FHFA to continue dividends on the Enterprises' junior preferred stock.
15 4
Banks have also been unsuccessful in securing significant regulatory capital
forbearance from regulators.'55 Instead, regulators have sometimes ordered
banks to raise capital as a result of Fannie and Freddie losses.'
56
151 See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, OVERSIGHT REPORT: SMALL BANKS IN THE
CAPITAL PURCHASE PROGRAM 11-14 (July 14, 2010).
152 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., REP. No. MLR-10-
036, MATERIAL Loss REVIEW OF NORTH HOUSTON BANK, HOUSTON, TEXAS, AND
MADISONVILLE STATE BANK, MADISONVILLE, TEXAS 23-24 (May 20, 2010 [hereinafter NORTH
HOUSTON BANK AND MADISONVILLE STATE BANK MATERIAL LOSS REVIEW]); OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, REP. No. OIG-09-042, SAFETY & SOUNDNESS:
MATERIAL LOSS REVIEW OF NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE 6-7(Aug. 6, 2009) [hereinafter
NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE MATERIAL Loss REVIEW].
153 According to one bank executive:
[F]rom the beginning, [the OCC] acknowledged that our issue was
[Enterprise stock] only. They referred to us as a well-managed bank with
strong asset quality and a good track record.
And they strongly recommended us for TARP approval in October. We
were approved for TARP approval by the regulatory committee. But be-
cause we were not a publicly traded bank, they had no rules in place to
deal with private banks that did not have a stock price.
Therefore, we were deferred, and that deferral took us into January
and February. The rules totally changed. The rules became so restrictive
that the only way you get TARP is you had to be well-capitalized. We, by
virtue of the [Enterprise stock] losses, were not well-capitalized. There-
fore, we didn't qualify. The rules were vastly different for the larger, pub-
licly traded banks than they were subsequently for the smaller banks and
privately-traded.
The Condition of Financial Institutions: Examining the Failure and Seizure of an American
Bank: Hearing Before the Subcom. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer Credit, of the H. Comm. on
Fin. Servcs., 111 th Cong. 22 (2010) (testimony of Michael E. Kelly, Chairman and CEO,
FBOP Co, . See Commercial Real Estate: A Chicago Perspective on Current Market Chal-
lenges and Possible Responses: Field Hearing Before Subcomm. on Oversight and Investiga-
tion of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 11 th Cong. 167 (2010) (prepared statement of Greg
Ohlendorf, President & CEO, First Community Bank, on behalf of Indep. Community Bank-
ers Ass'n and Community Bankers Ass'n of Illinois) (stating that "[d]ividend payments
should be resumed for [Fannie and Freddie] preferred shares").
155 Banks requested this relief shortly after the FHFA announced the conserva-
torships. See Letter from the Independent Community Bankers of America to Ben S. Bemanke
(Chairman, Federal Reserve System), John C. Dugan (Comptroller of the Currency), John M.
Reich (Dir., Office of Thrift Supervision), and Sheila C. Bair (Chairman, Federal Deposit
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Some banks, however, were unable to recover from the losses. Ac-
cording to material loss reports and in-depth loss reviews prepared by bank
regulators,'57 Fannie and Freddie losses contributed to the failure of at least
eight banks. 158 These bank failures are detailed in Figure 1. Because regula-
tors prepare material loss reports only for those bank failures that result in a
"material loss" to the federal deposit insurance fund, 5 9 it is likely that Figure
I under-reports the number of banks that failed due in part to losses on En-
terprise stock.16
0
Insurance Corporation) (Sept. 9, 2008), available at http://www.icba.org/files/ICBASites/
PDFs/ItrO90908.pdf.
156 See, e.g., In re Nevada Security Bank, Order No. FDIC-09-173b (June 29,
2009) (cease-and-desist order); Judy Newman, FDIC Orders Evergreen State Bank to Take
Prompt Corrective Action, Wis. ST. J., Jan. 28, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 1793236 (re-
porting that Evergreen Bank received consent and cease-and-desist orders based in part on
Fannie and Freddie losses); Laurie Winslow, Fix Problems, Exchange Bank Told, TULSA
WORLD, Jan.8, 2010, at El (reporting that Exchange Bank received a cease-and-desist consent
order from the FDIC after losing $4 million on Fannie and Freddie stock); see also Donna
Block, FDIC Grilled on Community Bank Seizures, DAiLY DEAL, Jan. 21, 2010, available at
2010 WLNR 1681342 (stating that "then-Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson's promise to help
community banks by developing capital restoration plans in the wake of Fannie and Freddie's
seizures never materialized").
' See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831o(k)(1)(A) (West 2012) (requiring "the office of the in-
spector general of the appropriate Federal banking agency [to] make a written report to...
ascertain why the institution's problems resulted in a material loss to the Deposit Insurance
Fund [and] make recommendations for preventing any such loss in the future"); id. §
1831 o(k)(5) (instructing bank regulators to prepare an "in-depth review of the loss" when the
loss is not material, but "unusual circumstances exist").
158 An additional bank, PFF Bank and Trust, failed after its plan to be acquired by
another branch fizzled. The acquirer was unable to complete the transaction due to its losses
on Fannie and Freddie preferred stock. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, REP. No. OIG-09-038, SAFETY & SOUNDNESS: MATERIAL Loss REVIEW OF PFF
BANK AND TRUST 3-7(June 12, 2009).
159 At the time Fannie and Freddie were taken into conservatorship, "material
loss" was defined as $25 million, or 2% of the bank's total assets at the time of failure. See 12
U.S.C. § 1831 o(k)(2)(B) (2006). However, Congress has since amended the definition of"ma-
terial loss." For banks that failed between January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2011, "material
loss" means a loss greater than $200,000,000. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831 o(k)(2)(B) (West 2012).
Under the new definition, regulators are less likely to prepare a material loss report for small
banks.
160 For example, North Houston Bank and Madisonville State Bank were both
owned by the same financial holding company. See NORTH HOUSTON BANK AND
MADISONVILLE STATE BANK MATERIAL Loss REVIEW, supra note 152, at 3. The holding com-
pany also owned the failed Community Bank of Lemont. Id. at 1. Although the Community
Bank of Lemont's failure was also likely precipitated by investments in Enterprise stock, the
FDIC did not prepare a material loss review for Lemont because its loss was not "material" to
the deposit insurance fund. See id. (stating that the Lemont failure was not material to the
deposit insurance fund); Becky Yerak, Buried by Bank's Death Two Founders of Failed
Community Bank of Lemont Blame Regulators for the Loss of Their Investments and Poten-




Figure 1: Bank Failures Due to Losses on Fannie and Freddie Stock 16
Fannie & Freddie Total Assets Primary
Loss (in millions) (in millions) Regulator
Midwest Bank $84.6 $3,100 Federal
and Trust Co. Reserve
Venture Bank $40.1 $992.4 FDIC
Cooperative Bank $9.1 $973.6 FDIC
North Houston Bank $42.9 $325.3 FDIC
Madisonville $25.5 $237.8 FDIC
State Bank
Great Basin Bank $2.1 $228.8 FDIC
of Nevada
National Bank $93.7 $163.1 OCC
of Commerce
The Gordon Bank $1.8 $30.5 FDIC
These failures illustrate the burden of Fannie and Freddie losses on
small banks. Of the eight failed banks, only one had more than $1 billion in
assets. The Gordon Bank and Madisonville State Bank each had only a single
location in a rural area.' 62 Regulatory reports explain that the failed banks'
investments in Fannie and Freddie stock were part of conservative invest-
ment strategies.163 Before Fannie's and Freddie's conservatorships, bank
161 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.,
MATERIAL Loss REVIEW OF MIDWEST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY 17 (Dec. 8, 2010); OFFICE
OF INSPECTOR GEN., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., REP. No. MLR- 10-029, MATERIAL LOSS REVIEW
OF VENTURE BANK, LACEY, WASHINGTON 1-10 (Apr. 9, 2010); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.,
FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., REP. No. MLR-10-013, MATERIAL LOSS REVIEW OF COOPERATIVE
BANK, WILMINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA 9 (Jan. 6, 2010); NORTH HOUSTON BANK AND
MADISONVILLE STATE BANK MATERIAL LOSS REVIEW, supra note 152, at 7; OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GEN., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., REP. No. MLR-10-008, MATERIAL LOSS REVIEW OF
GREAT BASIN BANK OF NEVADA, ELKO, NEVADA 11 (Dec. 4. 2009); NATIONAL BANK OF
COMMERCE MATERIAL LOSS REVIEW, supra note 152, at 4; OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FED.
DEPOSIT INS. CORP., REP. No. AUD-1 1-006, IN-DEPTH REVIEW OF THE FAILURE OF THE
GORDON BANK, GORDON, GEORGIA 3 (May 11, 2011) [hereinafter THE GORDON BANK IN-
DEPTH REVIEW].
162 See NORTH HOUSTON BANK AND MADISONVILLE STATE BANK MATERIAL Loss
REVIEW, supra note 152, at 4; THE GORDON BANK IN-DEPTH REVIEW, supra note 161, at 2.
163 See NORTH HOUSTON BANK AND MADISONVILLE STATE BANK MATERIAL Loss
REVIEW, supra note 152, at 16 ("Like many insured institutions, North Houston and Madi-
sonville invested in the preferred shares of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac because the securi-
ties were generally viewed as having low credit risk at the time the investments were made.");
NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE MATERIAL LOss REVIEW, supra note 152, at 2 ("All things
considered, we believe that NBC acted in good faith when it invested in the GSE securities.").
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regulators raised few concerns about the riskiness of the Enterprises'
stock.' 64
Other community banks with large losses on the Enterprises' stock
escaped failure by selling themselves to other banks. For example, State of
Franklin Bankshares Inc. (a bank holding company with $330 million in as-
sets) agreed to sell to Jefferson Bankshares Inc. after realizing a $10 million
loss on the Enterprises' preferred shares. 65 Similarly, Gateway Financial
Holding Inc. (a bank holding company with $2.1 billion in assets) agreed to
sell to Hampton Roads Bankshares Inc. after realizing a $40 million loss on
the Enterprises' preferred shares.166 Camden Fine, president of the Independ-
ent Community Bankers of America, estimated that forty community banks
would be forced to sell due to Fannie and Freddie stock losses.
67
In conclusion, the FHFA's decision to allow Treasury to purchase
the Enterprises' senior preferred stock resulted in significant protection for
those that owned Enterprise debt, including large financial institutions. At
the same time, Treasury's investment in senior preferred stock resulted in
losses for banks that held the Enterprises' stock. While both small and large
banks experienced losses, small banks were harder hit because their invest-
ments in the Enterprises' stock sometimes constituted a significant portion of
their assets. The FHFA's decision to require banks to bear Enterprise stock
losses caused some banks to fail and other banks to consolidate.
C. Enforcing Rights against Sellers
The FHFA's most recent loss-shifting decisions involve the Enter-
prises' efforts to collect claims they have against those who sold the Enter-
prises mortgages or mortgage-backed securities. Currently, the Enterprises'
losses come from two primary sources. First, as mortgages the Enterprises
purchased default, Fannie and Freddie recognize losses, either because they
carry the mortgages on their books, or because they guarantee the mortgage-
backed securities created with the mortgages. 68 Second, the Enterprises in-
cur losses as the private-label securities they purchased decline in value due
16 See NORTH HOUSTON BANK AND MADISONVILLE STATE BANK MATERIAL Loss
REVIEW, supra note 152, at 16 (acknowledging that "no serious concerns regarding the [Fan-
nie and Freddie] securities were raised [by the banks' regulators]"); NATIONAL BANK OF
COMMERCE MATERIAL LOSS REVIEW, supra note 152, at 8-9 ("[A]t the time NBC made the
purchases of the GSE securities, there would have been little basis to criticize the bank given
the regulatory standards and perception of minimal risk associated with these holdings. There-
fore, we do not fault OCC for not taking issue with NBC's investment practices.").
165 See Hechinger, supra note 147, at Cl.
166 See id.
167 See id.
... See FHFA 2009 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 99, at iv-v; Frame, supra
note 58, at 12.
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to mortgage defaults and market conditions. 69 In both of these cases, the
Enterprises might have rights enforceable against the entities (often commer-
cial banks) from which they purchased the mortgages or private-label securi-
ties. 70 The FHFA has instructed the Enterprises to enforce their rights
against banks who breached contractual warranties or other laws when sell-
ing mortgages or private-label securities to the Enterprises.' 71 Yet in some
instances the FHFA allows the Enterprises to settle such claims for what ap-
pears to be a fraction of their face value. 72 The following sections describe
the FHFA's and the Enterprises' efforts to shift credit losses to banks in
greater detail.
1. Mortgage Repurchases
The "FHFA has determined as conservator that the Enterprises
should actively enforce lender compliance with contractual obligations,
which include pursuing repurchases from those institutions whose loans did
not meet the Enterprises' underwriting and eligibility guidelines."'
73
When an Enterprise purchases mortgages, the seller makes various
representations and warranties to that Enterprise. Among other things, the
seller warrants that the mortgages meet Fannie's or Freddie's underwriting
and documentation criteria. If Fannie or Freddie later discovers that mort-
gages do not comply with the representations and warranties, the seller is
legally obligated to repurchase the mortgages. 75 "[T]riggers that may force
put-backs include undisclosed liabilities, income or employment misrepre-
sentation, property value falsification, and the mishandling of escrow
funds.' 76 If the seller is unable or unwilling to repurchase the mortgages, the
Enterprise might refuse to purchase further mortgages from that seller.
177
To ensure that mortgage sellers adhere to their representations and
warranties, both Fannie and Freddie review a sample of mortgages for com-
169 See FHFA 2009 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 99, at iv-v; Frame, supra
note 58, at 12-14.
170 See FHFA 2010 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 12, at 3-4.
1 See id.
.72 See infra notes 202, 214-217, 266, and accompanying text.
173 FHFA 2010 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 12, at 3.
174 FANNIE MAE SELLING GUIDE, supra note 16, § A2-2; FREDDIE MAC SELLER
GUIDE, supra note 16, § 6.11.
175 FANNIE MAE SELLING GUIDE, supra note 16, § A2-3.2-01; FREDDIE MAC
SELLER GUIDE, supra note 16, § 72.1. In some instances, an Enterprise may purchase a mort-
gage with recourse. For these mortgages, the seller "agrees to repurchase any mortgage that is
delinquent for more than a specified period (usually 120 days), regardless of whether there has
been a breach of representations and warranties." Fed. Home Loan Mort. Corp., Annual Re-
port (Form 10-K) 57 (Mar. 9, 2012).
176 CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 114, at 65.
177 See Floyd Norris, Sticking Banks with the Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2010, at
B 1; Dale A. Whitman, How Negotiability Has Fouled Up the Secondary Mortgage Market,
and What to Do About It, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 737, 746 (2010).
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pliance..17 8 Both Enterprises use sampling techniques that review a greater
number of underperforming loans.179 If either Enterprise discovers a breach,
the Enterprise can immediately request that the seller repurchase the mort-
gage. 180 Both Enterprises have requested that sellers repurchase performing
mortgages as well as mortgages in default.'
18
Since entering conservatorship, the Enterprises have collected bil-
lions from their mortgage repurchase requests. In 2009, "the Enterprises'
lenders repurchased $8.7 billion of single-family mortgages[.]"' 8 2 In 2010,
lenders reimbursed the Enterprises for losses on $15.2 billion of loans. 183 In
2011, lenders reimbursed the Enterprises for losses on $11.5 billion of
loans.184 Because many of the mortgages originated during the housing boom
are still outstanding, it is likely that high levels of repurchase requests will
continue. 185 A 2010 government report estimated that banks will ultimately
pay $71 billion to repurchase deficient loans that the Enterprises purchased
during the housing boom.
186
Banks that repurchase mortgages often realize a loss. However, the
loss is typically lower than the outstanding balance on the loan. First, not all
repurchased loans are in default.8 7 Second, even if the borrower does not
pay, the lender can still attempt to collect the loan through foreclosure. If the
amount received through foreclosure (less the expenses of the foreclosure
process) is less than the outstanding balance, the lender will often realize a
loss. 188 Estimates suggest that lenders are able to recover about fifty percent
178 See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY CoMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 224-
25(2011).
179 See id.
180 See FANNIE MAE SELLING GUIDE, supra note 16, § A2-3.2-01; FREDDIE MAC
SELLER GUIDE, supra note 16, § 72.1.
181 See American Mortgages: Return to Lender, ECONOMIST, Feb. 6, 2010, at 82;
Paul Muolo, Stung by Investor Loan Buybacks, Wisconsin Lender Closes Its Doors, NAT'L
MORTGAGE NEWS, May 17, 2010, at 2.
182 The Future of Housing Finance: A Progress Update on the GSEs: Hearing Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov't Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on
Fin. Servs., 111 th Cong. 59 (2010) (statement of Edward J. DeMarco, Acting Dir., FHFA).
183 See Fed. Nat'i Mort. Ass'n, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 16 (Feb. 24, 2011)
(reporting settlement of repurchase requests on $8.8 billion in mortgages during 2010); Fed.
Home Loan Mort. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 108 (Feb. 24, 2011) (reporting settle-
ment of repurchase requests on $6.4 billion in mortgages during 2010).
184 See Fed. Nat'l Mort, Ass'n, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 175 (Feb. 29, 2012)
(reporting settlement of repurchase requests on $11.5 billion in mortgages during 2011); Fed.
Home Loan Mort. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 130 (Mar. 9, 2012) (reporting settle-
ment of repurchase request on $4.5 billion in mortgages during 2011).
185 See Fed. Nat'l Mort. Ass'n, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 57 (Feb. 29, 2012)
(predicting that repurchase requests will remain high).
186 CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 114, at 72.
187 See supra notes 180-181 and accompanying text.
188 See Christian Conte, Fannie/Freddie Loan Buybacks Hurt Local Banks' Prof-
its, JACKSONVILLE Bus. J., Feb. 4, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 2300311.
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of the value of the loan. 89 Even so, the potential impact to banks is large-
an estimated $36 billion according to a congressional oversight panel.' 90
Unsurprisingly then, some banks are unable or unwilling to repur-
chase loans from Fannie and Freddie. At the end of 2011, the Enterprises had
$13.1 billion in outstanding repurchase requests.' 9' For repurchase requests
that remain outstanding, the Enterprises foreclose on the mortgaged proper-
ties and then seek to recoup actual losses from the seller.
92
In attempting to collect outstanding repurchase requests, the Enter-
prises have some leverage. For example, an Enterprise may threaten to limit
a delinquent seller's ability to sell new mortgages to the Enterprise or service
mortgages owned by the Enterprise. 193 However, the Enterprises and the
FHFA face a dilemma as they seek to collect from banks. On the one hand,
any amounts collected from banks reduce the Enterprises' losses and help the
Enterprises return to financial health. On the other hand, if the FHFA forces
a large number of repurchases, it could destabilize the mortgage market.
When the FHFA forces a lender to bear losses, the losses can potentially
cause the lender to fail. For example, Universal Mortgage, a Wisconsin-
based nonbank lender, failed after two secondary market investors demanded
that Universal repurchase mortgages it had sold to them. 94 Anonymous
sources suggest that Fannie was one of the investors that demanded repur-
chases from Universal.'95 While commercial banks may be able to handle
repurchase requests better than other nonbank lenders, like Universal,'
96
189 See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 114, at 71 (stating that [t]he blended
average [loss] severity rate [for loans that are successfully put-back to banks] used by analysts
for both [Enterprise] and the private-label loans is 50 percent"); Obama Should Focus on
Sluggish Housing to Boost Economy, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, Sept. 9, 2011, at B6 ("Paul Mil-
ler of FBR Capital Markets, an investment bank, calculated that banks have incurred losses of
roughly 50 per cent on the $31 billion of loans they have repurchased from the GSEs since the
beginning of 2009.").
190 CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 114, at 72.
'9' See Fed. Nat'l Mort. Ass'n, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 16 (Feb. 24, 2011)
(reporting $10.4 billion in outstanding mortgage repurchase requests); Fed. Home Loan Mort.
Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 130 (Mar. 9, 2012) (reporting $2.7 billion in outstanding
repurchase requests).
192 Fed. Nat'i Mort. Ass'n, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 172 (Feb. 24, 2011) (stat-
ing that "[l]enders have the option to remit payment equal to our loss, including imputed in-
terest, on the loan after we have disposed of the [foreclosed property], which is less than the
unpaid principal balance of the loan"); Fed. Home Loan Mort. Corp., Annual Report (Form
10-K) 47 (Feb. 24, 2011) ("In lieu of repurchase, we may agree to allow a seller/servicer to
indemnify us against losses on such mortgages or otherwise compensate us for the risk of
continuing to hold the mortgages.").
9 See supra note 177 and accompanying text (describing the Enterprises' rights);
Fed. Home Loan Mort. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 108 (Feb. 24, 2011) (describing
Freddie's potential avenues for collecting outstanding mortgage repurchase requests).
94 Muolo, supra note 181, at 2.
195 id.
196 For a performing mortgage, a bank might repurchase the mortgage and hold it
in its own loan portfolio. Nonbank lenders might not hold a portfolio of mortgages, and there-
fore have less ability to hold even performing mortgages. See Paul Muolo, Boom Times for
2012]
HA ML INE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 35:343
banks are still impacted by repurchase requests. 197 Losses may cause banks
to reduce lending, 98 and if extreme, losses may even contribute to some
banks' failures. 199 If too many lenders are impacted or if the losses are too
large, repurchase requests could threaten the stability of the mortgage mar-
ket.
200
In addition, if at the direction of the FHFA, the Enterprises seek to
collect from failed banks, any collection may come from the already-taxed
federal deposit insurance fund. For example, both Fannie and Freddie made
repurchase requests to IndyMac Bank, a large thrift that failed in July
2008.201 Fannie ultimately settled its claim by accepting payment from the
FDIC that "was significantly less than... existing and projected losses relat-
ed to the repurchases. '2 °2
The Enterprises could also be negatively impacted by their collection
efforts. If the Enterprises terminate contracts with lenders to induce the lend-
ers to resolve outstanding repurchase requests, the Enterprises might cause
even further consolidation in the primary mortgage market.20 3 The Enterpris-
es might also destroy the pipeline of available loans, making the Enterprises
unable to reach their affordable housing goals.2 4
February 2012, Bank of America announced that as a result of con-
flict over repurchase requests, it would no longer sell certain mortgages to
Fannie Mae.20 5 Bank of America complained that Fannie's mortgage repur-
GSE, Bank Buybacks, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, Feb. 22, 2010, at 1. In addition, banks' access
to "deposits or other ready sources of cash" could help them weather losses. See Nick
Timiraos & Aparajita Saha-Bubna, Banks Face Fight Over Mortgage-Loan Buybacks, WALL
ST. J., Au. 18, 2010, at C1.
97 Cf Conte, supra note 188 (noting that mortgage repurchases can result in loss-
es that reduce a bank's capital reserves).
198 See Hill, supra note 138, at 706 (describing how bank losses can cause banks
to restrict lending).
'99 Cf Mark DeCambre, Backdoor Bailout-Furor Over BofA's $2.8B Mortgage
Settlement, N.Y. POST, Jan. 5, 2011, at 27 (explaining that Edward Pinto of the American En-
terprise Institute believes that if Fannie and Freddie aggressively pursued mortgage repurchas-
es from Bank of America, "it would.., really cause[] problems for" the bank).
200 Cf Bradley Keoun, Bad Mortgages Costing Lenders, NEWS J. (Wilmington,
DE), Mar. 6, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 4762310 ('It's a fine line you're walking, be-
cause the government's trying to recapitalize the banks, not put them in bankruptcy, and then
here's Fannie and Freddie putting more pressure on the banks through these buybacks,' [Paul
Miller, an analyst at FBR Capital Markets] said.").
201 See Kate Berry, Freddie Presses IndyMac Case, AM. BANKER, May 14, 2009,
at 10; Teri Buhl, FDIC Faces Up to $10B Whack on IndyMac Loans, N.Y. POST, Jan. 11,
2009, at 32 (describing the Enterprises' repurchase requests).
202 Fed. Nat'l Mort. Ass'n, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 93 (May 8, 2009).
203 Cf Fed. Nat'l Mort. Ass'n, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 48 (Feb. 24, 2011)
(noting "ongoing consolidation with the mortgage industry").
2 See Fed. Home Loan Mort. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 261 (Feb. 24,
2011) (stating that Freddie could "lose purchase volume to the extent that [purchase] arrange-
ments are terminated without replacement from other lenders").
205 Bank of America Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 5 (Feb. 23, 2012) ("Be-
ginning in February 2012, we are no longer delivering purchase money and non-Making
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chase requests were not consistent with the Enterprise's past practices or
with Bank of America's contractual obligations.2 °6 Bank of America stated
that its move away from Fannie Mae would have little impact on its mort-
gage business because the Bank would continue to sell mortgages to Freddie
Mac.2°7 At the time, at least one mortgage industry observer speculated that
Bank of America's move was crafted to induce Fannie to move to more rea-
sonable mortgage repurchase requests.20 8
A few days after Bank of America's announcement, Fannie Mae
made its own public disclosure stating that it (rather than Bank of America)
had decided to restrict the pipeline of new mortgages from Bank of America
to the Enterprise. 20 9 Fannie explained that its move was motivated.by Bank
of America's failure to resolve outstanding mortgage repurchase requests. 10
In 2011, Bank of America accounted for "approximately 12% of [Fannie's]
single-family business volume. 22 ' In addition, Bank of America and its affil-
iates "serviced approximately 21% of [Fannie's] single-family guaranty book
of business .. 212 Nevertheless, Fannie Mae predicted that the change
would have little financial impact on the Enterprise.213
While Fannie's move with respect to Bank of America is aggressive,
it does not appear that either Enterprise is willing to go to such extreme
length to collect all repurchase claims. Perhaps motivated by its mandate to
provide mortgage market stability or perhaps motivated by a desire to main-
tain a pipeline of mortgages for the Enterprises, FHFA authorized the Enter-
prises to enter some settlement agreements not just with the FDIC,21 4 but also
with banks. Prior to its falling out with Bank of America, Fannie had settled
$3.9 billion in repurchase claims by agreeing to accept payment from Bank
Home Affordable Program (MHA) refinance first-lien residential mortgage products into
[Fannie Mae] mortgage-backed securities (MBS) pools because of the expiration and mutual
non-renewal or certain contractual delivery commitments and variances that permit efficient
delivery of such loans to [Fannie Mae].").
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 David Benoit & Nic Timiraos, Global Finance: BofA Pares Its Ties to Fannie,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2012, at C3 ("The decision to sharply curtail loan deliveries to Fannie is
significant because 'to my knowledge, no lender large or small has ever taken that step' said
Guy Cecala, publisher of Inside Mortgage Finance. 'Let's face it: This is a pretty big piece of
artillery BofA is using."').
209 Fed. Nat'l Mort. Ass'n, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 176-77 (Feb.2012).
210 Fannie explained that "[i]n the fourth quarter of 2011, Bank of America slowed
the pace of its repurchases. As a result, the already high volume of [Fannie's] outstanding
repurchase requests with Bank of America increased substantially," Id. at 52. In an effort to
"address Bank of America's delays in honoring [its] repurchase requests [Fannie] did not re-
new [its] existing loan delivery contract with [the Bank]." Id. at 176.
211 Id. at52.
212 Id. at 175.
213 Id. at 177 ("We do not expect the change in our agreement with Bank of Amer-
ica to be material to our business or results of operations as Bank of America represented less
than 5% of our loan delivery volume in the quarter ended December 31, 2011.").
214 See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
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of America totaling $1.5 billion.215 Fannie also reached a settlement with
Ally Financial, Inc., under which the Enterprise received $462 million to re-
solve $292 billion worth of repurchase requests.216 Similarly, Freddie agreed
to accept $1.28 billion from Bank of America to settled Freddie's demand for
repurchase of $114 billion in mortgages.217
There is disagreement about whether the Enterprises' buyback de-
mands and settlements strike the right balance of limiting the Enterprises'
losses while recognizing the Enterprises' public purpose. Some criticize the
repurchase requests as overaggressive moves by the Enterprises that unfairly
burden banks during an economic downturn. 218 Others decry the settlements
as sweetheart deals for banks that force the Enterprises and the taxpayers to
realize losses.2 19 Part of the disagreement stems from the fact that outsiders
are unsure how much balancing the FHFA did in approving the settlements.
Because neither the Enterprises nor the banks release proprietary information
that would allow detailed loss estimates for the underlying mortgages, it is
impossible to determine the amount of loss that the Enterprises may realize
as a result of settlements. The FHFA has said only that the Enterprises' set-
tlements with Bank of America were "consistent with market practice and
FHFA's conservatorship responsibilities., 220 The FHFA's Office of Inspector
General is reviewing the settlements,221 but it is unclear whether this review
will result in the public release of additional information concerning the set-
tlements.
In any event, it is likely that large banks will receive the majority of
the Enterprises' mortgage repurchase requests. As previously discussed, the
215 Fed. Nat'l Mort. Ass'n, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 173 (Feb. 24, 2011)
("Bank of America agreed, among other things, to a resolution amount of $1.5 billion, consist-
ing of a cash payment of $1.3 billion made by Bank of America on December 31, 2010, and
other payments recently made or to be made by them.").
216 See id.; Regulator Asked to Clarify Settlements, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 13, 2011,
at6.
217 Fed. Home Loan Mort. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 109 (Feb. 24,
2011). Freddie also reached settlements of an undisclosed amount with GMAC Mortgage,
LLC and Residential Funding Company, LLC, subsidiaries of Ally Financial Inc. Id.
218 See Muolo, supra note 196, at 1 (quoting a Wall Street managing director who
said, "Three years after a loan is made and suddenly Fannie or Freddie wants a buyback. It
seems ridiculous. Whose portfolio can stand that test of time?"); see also note 206 and ac-
companying text (discussing Bank of America's criticism of Fannie's buyback requests).
219 DeCambre, supra note 199, at 27 ("'I'm concerned that the settlement between
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and Bank of America over misrepresentations in the mortgages
BofA originated may amount to a backdoor bailout that props up the bank at the expense of
taxpayers,' Congresswoman Maxine Waters (D-Calif.) said .. "); David S. Hilzenrath, Bank
of America Settles Loan Dispute with Fannie and Freddie, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2011, at A10
("'This is a gift' from the government to the bank, said Christopher Whalen of Institutional
Risk Analytics. 'We're all paying for this because it will show up in the losses from Fannie
and Freddie,' he said.").
220 Hilzenrath, supra note 220, at A10.
221 See FED. Hous. FIN. AGENCY OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., INAUGURAL
SEMIANNUAL REPORT To THE CONGRESS 23, 43 (Mar. 31. 2011).
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bulk of the Enterprises' mortgage purchases came from a handful of large
banks, including Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo, and
Citigroup.222 Consequently, these banks will likely face most of the Enter-
prises' repurchase requests.223 However, the Enterprises' repurchase requests
do not fall solely on large banks. Fannie and Freddie have requested mort-
gage repurchases from smaller banks.224 Moreover, large banks that receive
mortgage repurchase requests from the Enterprises may not have originated
the loans. Some large banks are already requesting that smaller banks and
other mortgage originators repurchase loans.225 Smaller banks are likely less
able than their larger competitors to negotiate favorable settlements on loan
repurchase requests because the Enterprises and large banks are unlikely to
rely on a pipeline of loans from smaller banks.22 6 In addition, the FHFA is
unlikely to view the failure of a few smaller banks as a danger to the stability
of the mortgage market. Thus, although the largest banks will face the bulk
of repurchase requests, small banks and nonbank lenders are more likely to
be fatally wounded by repurchase requests.
2. Private-Label Securities Litigation
The FHFA is also helping the Enterprises recoup losses on private-
label securities. Fannie and Freddie, like many mortgage investors, pur-
chased private-label securities issued by large financial institutions. Many of
the mortgages backing these private-label securities were sub-prime or Alt-A
mortgages.227 The Enterprises' losses on these securities have been particu-
228larly steep.
When an issuer offers private-label securities for sale, the issuer pro-
vides information to potential investors describing the securities. This infor-
mation is contained in registration statements, prospectuses, and prospectus
supplements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.229 For
222 See supra notes 111-114 and accompanying text.
223 See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 114, at 66-67 (describing the Enter-
prises' repurchase requests to large banks).
224 See Conte, supra note 188.
225 See Amilda Dymi, War Over Buybacks Add to Pressure, NAT'L MORTGAGE
NEWS, June 7, 2010, at 13.
226 See supra notes 111-113 and accompanying text.
227 See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, supra note 178, at 225 ("[O]ver
the course of the housing boom the [Enterprises] purchased $690 billion of subprime and Alt-
A private-label securities."); Frame, supra note 58, at 13 ("As of mid-year 2007, the [Enter-
prises] held $252.7 billion in mortgage securities backed by subprime and Alt-A mortgages-
virtually all of which were rated AAA.").
228 "Market values of private-label mortgage-backed securities held by the Enter-
prises plummeted during [2008]." FHFA 2008 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 82, at 29.
Fannie lost "more than $26 billion," and Freddie lost "more than $53 billion." Id. at 32, 47.
229 See TASK FORCE ON MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES DISCLOSURE, STAFF
REPORT: ENHANCING DISCLOSURE IN THE MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES MARKETS 24-25
(Jan. 2003), available at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps77447/disclosure.pdf ("Unlike
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mortgage-backed securities, these documents describe the characteristics of
the mortgages backing the securities, such as the underwriting guidelines that
were used in originating the mortgages.230 Issuers of private-label securities
purchased by the Enterprises followed these same practices.23' In addition
"securities sold to the Enterprises were often customized for their purchase
because of the conforming loan requirement of [the Enterprises'] char-
ters.
232
As the Enterprises experienced losses on the private-label securities,
they began to "assess and enforce their rights as investors., 233 In particular,
"the Enterprises ...attempted to determine whether misrepresentations,
breaches of warranties or other acts or omissions by [private-label securities]
counterparties would require repurchase of loans underlying the [securities]
by the counterparties and whether other remedies might be appropriate. 234
To determine whether misrepresentations or breaches of warranty occurred,
the Enterprises needed to compare actual loan files with the sellers' represen-
tations. However, the servicers (often large banks) that held these files were
unwilling to voluntarily provide the Enterprises with the requested docu-
ments. 35
For other private-label securities investors, getting access to loan
files has proved to be a large barrier to successful suits against the securities
issuers.236The FHFA helped the Enterprises overcome this barrier by using
[Enterprise mortgage-backed securities], offerings of private-label [securities] are subject to
the registration requirements of the federal securities laws. As such the offer and sale of these
securities must be done pursuant to a registration statement filed with the Commission or pur-
suant to an exemption.... Market participants have indicated that the vast majority of private-
label [securities], over 98% in 2001, are sold in registered transactions with the remainder
being sold in rule 144A transactions."); Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure's Failure in the Sub-
prime Mortgage Crisis, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1109, 1110 n.6 (noting that "the disclosure docu-
ments ordinarily consist of a prospectus and a prospectus supplement, each close to two-
hundred pages long").
230 See TASK FORCE ON MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES DISCLOSURE, supra note
230, at 26-27.
231 See Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, Federal Housing Finance Agency
Statement on Recent Lawsuits Filed (Sept. 6, 2011), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/ web-
files/22606/LawsuitStatement961 1.pdf [hereinafter FHFA Statement on Lawsuits].
232 Id.
233 Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, FHFA Issues Subpoenas for PLS Doc-
uments (July 12, 2010), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/
15935/PLS subpoena final 7 12 10.pdf [hereinafter FHFA Subpoena Press Release].
2J4 Id.
235 See id.
236 See Jia Lynn Yang, Mortgage Scandal Aids Argument of Securities Investors,
WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2010, at A19 (noting investors groups have "struggled to force the
banking industry to hand over data critical to [mortgage-backed securities] lawsuit[s]"). In
some cases, investors have sued the security issuer using statistical data and then sought loan
file documents through discovery. See, e.g., Complaint 7, Am. Int'l Group, Inc. v. Bank of
Am. Corp., No. 652199/2011, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 8, 2011), 2011 WL 3427135 (noting that
"AIG is confident that a review of the complete loan files in discovery will demonstrate that
the [mortgage-backed securities] fraud perpetrated by Defendants is even more rampant than
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its conservator powers to subpoena the needed loan documents. 237 On July
12, 2010, the FHFA announced that it had used its subpoena powers to re-
quest documents from sixty-four entities. 38 Although the FHFA did not re-
lease a list of the subpoena recipients, a few banks, including JP Morgan
Chase, disclosed that they received subpoenas.239
Using information they collected with the subpoenas, the FHFA and
the Enterprises filed suit against eighteen large financial institutions, includ-
ing Bank of America, Citigroup, and JPMorgan Chase.240 Each of the com-
plaints alleges that the defendants' offering documents contained untrue
statements of material fact in violation of sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the
Securities Act of 1933.241 Seventeen of the complaints also allege that the
defendants negligently represented the quality of the mortgages securitized.
242 Finally, some of the complaints contain allegations of state securities law
AIG's forensic analysis reveals."). Alternatively, a quorum of investors (usually at least 25%)
may demand that the security's trustee see access to loan files from the servicer. See Jeff
Horwitz, More Heat on Servicers: MBS Trustees Sue Them to Gain Access to Loan Files, AM.
BANKER, Feb. 7, 2011, at I (discussing trustees' actions to gain access to servicer documents).
237 See supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing the FHFA's subpoena
power as conservator).
238 FHFA Subpoena Press Release, supra note 234.
239 See, e.g., First Horizon Discloses Subpoena, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, TN),
Nov. 2, 2010, at C2 (reporting that First Horizon National Corp., parent company of First
Tennessee Bank received a subpoena); Dave Reilly, J.P. Morgan Growth Tale Unfinished,
WALL ST. J., July 16, 2010, at C10 (reporting that J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. received a sub-
poena).
240 Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, FHFA Sues UBS to Recover Losses to
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (July 27, 2011), available at
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/21842/UBS072711FINAL.pdf; Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin.
Agency, FHFA Sues 17 Firms to Recover Losses to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Sept. 2,
2011), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/22599/PLSLitigationfinal_090211 .pdf
[hereinafter FHFA Private-Label Securities Suits Press Release] (announcing suits against
Ally Financial Inc.; Bank of America Corporation; Barclays Bank PLC; Citigroup, Inc.; Coun-
trywide Financial Corporation; Credit Suisse Holdings (USA), Inc.; Deutsche Bank AG; First
Horizon National Corporation; General Electric Company; Goldman Sachs & Co.; HSBC
North America Holdings, Inc.; JPMorgan Chase & Co.; Merrill Lynch & Co. / First Franklin
Financial Corp; Morgan Stanley; Nomura Holding America Inc.; The Royal Bank of Scotland
Group PLC; and Socidtd Grndrale).
241 See Complaint at 87-96, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. UBS Americas Inc., No. 11
CIV 05201 ( S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2011), 2011 WL 3117873 (alleging UBS violated sections 11,
12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933); FHFA Private-Label Securities Suits Press
Release, supra note 241 (noting that the seventeen suits filed in September contained securi-
ties claims similar to those in the UBS suit); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2006) (providing
liability for registration statements that "contained an untrue statement of a material fact or
omitted to state a material fact required to be stated"); id. § 771(a)(2) (providing liability for
"any person who... offers or sells a security... by means of a prospectus or oral communi-
cation, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements ... not misleading"); id. § 77o(a) (providing for
joint and several liability of "controlling persons"--persons who control any person liable
under other securities laws).
242 See FHFA Private-Label Securities Suits Press Release, supra note 241 (de-
scribing complaints). Negligent misrepresentation is a common law claim that in New York
20121
HAMLINE LAWREVIEW [Vol. 35:343
violations and fraud. 243 The FHFA alleges the Enterprises were misled with
untrue representations concerning the loan-to-value ratios,2 " the owner oc-
cupancy rates,245 the credit ratings, 246 and the underwriting standards247 of the
underlying mortgages. While all of the complaints seek damages, only the
UBS complaint provides a dollar figure. 2 48 The UBS complaint seeks to re-. • ... 249
cover $900 million in losses from $4.5 billion in securities.
Some of the banks the FHFA sued immediately denied responsibil-
ity. For example, Deutsche Bank called the FHFA claims "unfounded. 25 °
Some banks argued that the Enterprises were sophisticated investors who
knew what they were purchasing. Deutsche explained, "Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac are the epitome of a sophisticated investor, having issued tril-
lions of dollars of mortgage-backed securities and purchased hundreds of
billions of dollars more, often after hand-picking the loans they now claim
should not have been included in the offerings.,
251
The FHFA was irked enough by these statements that it released a
response saying, "Under the securities laws at issue here, it does not matter
requires "(1) the existence of a special or privity-like relationship imposing a duty on the de-
fendant to impart correct information to the plaintiff; (2) that the information was incorrect;
and (3) reasonable reliance on the information." J.A.O. Acquisition Corp. v. Stavitsky, 863
N.E.2d 585, 587 (N.Y. 2007).
243 See FHFA Private-Label Securities Suits Press Release, supra note 241.
244 See, e.g., Complaint 7 116-21, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. Bank of America,
No. 11-CV-06195 (S.D.N.Y Sept. 2, 2011), 2011 WL 3873302.
245 See, e.g., Complaint 109-12, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. Citigroup, Inc., No.
1 -CV-06196 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2011), 2011 WL 3873301.
246 See, e.g., Complaint 104-07, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. Goldman, Sachs &
Co., No. 1 -CV-06198 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2011), 2011 WL 3873305.
247 See, e.g., Complaint IT 88-92, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. Gen. Electric Co.,
No. 652439/2011, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 2,2011), 2011 WL 6738328.
248 See FHFA Statement on Lawsuits, supra note 232. The FHFA explained:
FHFA seeks recoveries for losses associated with securities laws
violations and other improper actions set forth in the complaints. Actual
recoveries will be determined based on filings by the parties, evidence and
judicial findings. At this time, it would be premature and potentially mis-
leading to estimate the size of any potential recoveries. However, press
reports that FHFA is seeking nearly $200 billion in damages or recoveries
are excessive; such numbers reflect the original amount of such securities
purchased, not the losses incurred or the potential recoveries at the end of
this process.
Id.
249 See Complaint 331, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. UBS Americas Inc., No. 11
CIV 05201 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2011), 2011 WL 3117873.
250 Nelson D. Schwartz & Kevin Roose, U.S. Sues 17 Mortgage Institutions, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 3, 2011, at BI (quoting Deutsche Bank spokesman Frank Kelly); see also Nick
Timiraos et al., U.S. Sues Big Banks Over Home Mortgages, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2011, at Al
(reporting that Bank of America released a statement denying any impropriety).
251 Schwartz & Roose, supra note 251, at BI; see also Timiraos et al., supra note
251, at AI ("Bank of America issued a similar statement, noting that Fannie and Freddie 'con-
tinued to invest heavily in those securities even after their regulator told them they did not
have the risk management capabilities to do so."').
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how 'big' or 'sophisticated' a security purchaser is, the seller has a legal re-
sponsibility to accurately represent the characteristics of the loans backing
the securities being sold.
252
Both sides may be partly right. Sophisticated investors can generally
bring actions under sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act of
1933.253 However, a recent New York appellate court decision dismissed a
negligent misrepresentation claim brought against Countrywide for state-
ments it made to an insurer of mortgages that Countrywide securitized.254
The court explained that "negligent misrepresentation requires a showing of
a special relationship of trust or confidence[,]" but this type of relationship
"does not arise out of an ordinary arm's length business transaction between
two parties. 255 The court specifically noted that both Countrywide and the
insurer were "sophisticated commercial entities" capable of bargaining with
each other.256 At any rate, with banks vowing to fight the complaints, 25 7 it
may be years before the Enterprises receive payments as a result of this liti-
gation.258
However, in pursuing the private-label securities claims and poten-
tially negotiating settlements, the FHFA faces much the same dilemma it
does in pursuing mortgage repurchases. 259 If the FHFA is too zealous in its
efforts to minimize Enterprise losses, it may risk destabilizing the mortgage
market. Some commentators worry that the FHFA suits could push some
large banks to the brink of disaster. For example, "Tim Rood who worked at
Fannie Mae until 2006 and is now a partner at the Collingwood Group," wor-
ries that the FHFA suits "risk pushing these [banks] off a cliff and we're go-
252 See FHFA Statement on Lawsuits, supra note 232.
253 Sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 give standing to persons who purchase securities
from the issuer. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77o (2006). However, investors who "at the time
of acquisition... knew of such untruth or omission" are precluded from recovery. Id. § 77k.
254 MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 87 A.D.3d 287, 296-97
(N.Y. App. Div. 2011).
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 See, e.g., Robin Sidel et al., World-Wide, Bad News You Can Take to Bank,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2011, at CI (reporting that "RBS said it believed it has 'substantial and
credible legal and factual defenses to these claims and will defend them vigorously'); Nick
Timiraos & Al Yoon, Global Finance: Big Banks Face Suits on Mortgage Bond Losses,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 2011, at C3 (reporting that UBS stated it would "vigorously" defend the
FHFA's suit).
258 Fed. Home Loan Mort. Corp., Annual Report (Form IO-K) 45 (Feb. 24, 2011)
("The effectiveness of ... loss mitigation efforts [regarding private-label securities] is highly
uncertain and any potential recoveries may take significant time to realize."); David Reilly, No
Respite as Bank Suits Continue to Pinch Investors, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2011, at C26 (noting
that "the legal process [of the FHFA suits] could be protracted, so any losses [for banks] may
be years away").
259 See supra notes 194-204 and accompanying text (describing the dilemma
faced by the FHFA and Enterprises in collecting mortgage repurchase requests).
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ing to have to bail out the banks again.' 260 Others worry that protracted liti-
gation will stall economic recovery as banks hoard capital in anticipation of
potential losses. Credit Agricole analyst Mike Mayo opines, "Banks should
pay for what they did wrong, but at the same time they shouldn't be treated
as a big pifiata that has the effect of delaying the housing recovery. If banks
have to pay for loans they made five years ago, are they going to make new
ones?
261
The FHFA has acknowledged such worries but maintains that the
suits will promote market stability by enforcing securities laws. FHFA ex-
plained:
Some have claimed that these suits will disrupt eco-
nomic recovery, or endanger the targeted banks, or increase
their cost of capital. While everyone is concerned with these
important issues, the long-term stability and resilience of the
nation's financial system depends on investors being able to
trust that the securities sold in this country adhere to appli-
cable laws. We cannot overlook compliance with such re-
quirements during periods of economic difficulty as they
form the foundations for our nation's financial system.
Therefore, through these lawsuits, FHFA turns to the courts
to adjudicate the violations that it has alleged in its com-
plaints.262
The statement seems to suggest that the FHFA will require all of the sued
banks to completely cover losses on private-label securities and that the
FHFA will resort to litigation, if necessary, to secure such payment.
Notwithstanding the FHFA's seemingly hard-line statement, it seems
unlikely that the FHFA will be willing to litigate any of these suits to the
death of a large bank. First, the Enterprises depend on many of the large
banks as a source of new mortgages and as servicers of existing mortgag-
es.263 Collection efforts could, therefore, end up harming the Enterprises. Se-
cond, the FHFA has repeatedly stated that it hopes to encourage the return of
the private-label securities market.264 It may be difficult to encourage new
260 Nelson D. Schwartz, US. Is Set to Sue Dozen Big Banks Over Mortgages, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 2011, at Al.
61 Schwartz & Roose, supra note 251, at B1. A similar sentiment has been ex-
pressed by banking attorney Andrew Sandier:
The government is coming at the banks from every direction-
the FHFA lawsuits being the most recent example-at the same time the
government is putting enormous pressure on the banks to extend credit to
help alleviate the housing crisis .... It constitutes a completely incoherent
government approach to the housing crisis.
Timiraos et al., supra note 251, at Al.
262 FHFA Statement on Lawsuits, supra note 232.
263 See supra notes 111-113 and accompanying text.
264 See, e.g., FHFA 2010 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 12, at v (noting that




private securitization if the primary participants in the market face uncertain
or exorbitant losses. Moreover, the Enterprises have already started to reach
settlements on private-label securities claims. Even before the suits were
filed, Fannie had reached a settlement with Ally Financial that released "Ally
affiliates from potential liability relating to certain private-label securities
sponsored by the subsidiaries[.],, 265 It seems likely that other such settle-
ments will be reached. It is still unclear whether the Enterprises or large
banks will bear the bulk of losses on private-label securities.
IV. EVALUATING LOSS SHIFTING
An examination of the FHFA's key loss-shifting decisions shows
that the FHFA's conflicting mandate gives it significant power to determine
who will bear the financial impact of a huge number of soured mortgages. In
general, the FHFA has been more willing to shift losses to small banks and
less willing to shift losses to large banks, potentially exacerbating the prob-
lems of banks that are too big to fail. This Part explains why large bank fa-
voritism is in some ways an inevitable result of the FHFA's conflicting man-
dates.
The Article then argues that the FHFA's loss-shifting practices are
also troubling because the FHFA formulates its policies behind closed doors
with little opportunity for public comment. Even once the FHFA reaches a
loss-shifting decision, the FHFA rarely releases enough information for pub-
lic observers to evaluate the decision. This Article urges the FHFA to adopt
disclosure practices that will allow the public to evaluate the Enterprises'
settlements of mortgage repurchase and private-label mortgage-backed secu-
rities claims.
A. Too Big to Fail
While acting as conservator, the FHFA's loss-shifting policies have
often assisted large banks. The FHFA's decision to allow the Enterprises to
continue their secondary market activity has been a boon to large banks that
sell the vast majority of mortgages to the Enterprises.266 The FHFA's deci-
sion to allow Treasury investment in the Enterprises protected a number of
large banks that held Enterprise debt.267 And the Enterprises' settlements re-
garding mortgage repurchases and private-label securities liability have, so
far, seemed favorable to large banks.268
On the other hand, FHFA policies have sometimes strained small
banks. The FHFA's decision to allow Treasury investment in the Enterprises
hit small banks who owned the Enterprises' preferred stock especially
265 Fed. Nat'l Mort. Ass'n, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 173 (Feb. 24, 2011).
266 See supra notes 106-115 and accompanying text.
267 See supra notes 126-131 and accompanying text.
268 See supra notes 215-217, 266, and accompanying text.
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hard.269 In spite of efforts by bank regulators to minimize the damage, some
small banks still failed.27° In addition the FHFA's decisions to allow the En-
terprises to increase guarantee fees likely hurts small banks more than large
banks because large banks receive substantial volume discounts when selling
mortgages to the Enterprises. 27' At the same time, small banks are less likely
to benefit from the Enterprises' continued securitization efforts because
272many small banks do not originate or sell a large volume of mortgages.
To a certain extent, a preference for large banks is the naturally oc-
curring result of the FHFA's mandate to stabilize the secondary mortgage
market. Large financial institutions are more likely to pose systemic risk-
that is the risk that the failure of the bank or banks would have "socially un-
bearable macroeconomic consequences." 273 If a large or interconnected bank
fails, that failure could be disastrous to the entire economy. Thus, the
FHFA's market stability mandate suggests that the FHFA should avoid poli-
cies that cripple systemically important institutions. Small banks, on the oth-
er hand, that are not interconnected do not pose the same risk. After all, the
problem is popularly described as "too-big-to-fail," not "too-medium-to-fail"
or "too-small-to-fail. 274 Because damaging small banks may not have any
significant destabilizing impact on the broader market, the FHFA may be
able to shift losses to small banks in order to satisfy its mandate to return the
Enterprises to financial health.
Yet an approach that systematically shifts losses to smaller banks
while protecting larger banks is troubling from a public policy perspective
because it only exacerbates the too-big-to-fail problem. All bailouts tend to
encourage entities to achieve too-big-to-fail status. However, bailouts cou-
pled with policies that burden smaller competitors of the too-big-to-fail enti-
ties can cause even more consolidation and even more systemic risk.
B. Transparency
The FHFA's loss-shifting practices are also troubling because they
are not transparent. The FHFA can make loss-shifting decisions that signifi-
cantly impact the housing and financial markets as well as individual banks.
Yet the FHFA's decision-making process and results of its loss-shifting deci-
sions are largely hidden. Because the FHFA releases very little information,
it is difficult to determine how much each of the large banks have benefitted
269 See supra notes 132-143 and accompanying text.
270 See supra notes 144-167 and accompanying text.
271 See supra notes 116-118 and accompanying text.
272 See supra notes 111-115 and accompanying text.
273 See Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEo. L.J. 435, 446-47 (2011)
(defining "systemic risk").
27 For general discussions of the too-big-to-fail problem, see Ann Graham, Bring-
ing to Heel the Elephants in the Economy: The Case for Ending "Too Big to Fail," 8 PIERCE
L. REv. 117, 118-129 (2010); Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., Reforming Financial Regulation to
Address the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, 35 BROOK. J. INT'LL. 707, 739-47 (2010).
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from the FHFA decisions to continue securitizations, to allow Treasury to
effectively guarantee Enterprise debt, and to forgo mortgage repurchase re-
quests and private-label securities claims.
The result is that while there is public concern about the Treasury
dollars continuing to pour into Fannie and Freddie,275 most of the blame for
the Enterprises' continuing losses is placed at the feet of their flawed busi-
ness models, political pressure, inept or unscrupulous management, or lax
regulations and regulators.276 Rarely do commentators acknowledge the con-
tinuing assistance that Fannie and Freddie provide to the largest banks. Even
when press reports question FHFA settlements with sellers of mortgages and
private-label securities, the FHFA does not disclose enough information to
determine the actual loss the Enterprises are absorbing.277
It is generally believed that transparency encourages political ac-
countability. 278 It is certainly possible that if the FHFA more clearly dis-
closed its loss-shifting decisions and the impact of those decisions, the FHFA
would balance its mandates differently. For example, when Congress author-
ized Treasury's investment in banks through TARP, Congress explicitly stat-
ed that small banks must have equal access to TARP funds. 279 This type of
Congressional action seems to be predicated on a belief that small banks
should be treated at least as favorably as those financial institutions that en-
joy too-big-to-fail status. It is possible that if the FHFA's decisions were sub-
ject to transparent disclosure, it too would adopt practices that treat small
banks at least as favorably as larger banks.
It is important for policymakers to realize that Fannie and Freddie
are not the government's only economic or housing policy tools. If the gov-
ernment wants to provide assistance to banks (or homeowners or auto com-
panies) it has a variety of tools it can use. The FHFA's attempts to imple-
ment public policy goals through the Enterprises without meaningful disclo-
sure are similar to Congress' attempts to implement public policy goals
through the Enterprises while they were privately owned: they are both back-
275 See, e.g., Posters Have a Dialogue on the Future of the Secondary Market,
NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, Aug. 15, 2011, at 8 ("Fannie Mae wants more money. This is what
happens when politics trumps good business sense.").
276 See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY & U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEVELOP.,
REFORMING AMERICA'S HOUSING FINANCE MARKET: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 8-9 (Feb. 2011),
available at
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=housingfinmarketreform.pdf.
277 See supra notes 221-222 and accompanying text.
278 See, e.g., Margaret B. Kwoka, The Freedom of Information Act Trial, 61 AM.
U. L. REv. 217, 219 (2011) (noting that government transparency would lead to accountabil-
ity).
279 See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5213 (West 2012) (stating that Treasury should "ensur[e]
that all financial institutions are eligible to participate in the [TARP] program, without dis-
crimination based on size, geography, form of organization, or the size, type, and number of
assets eligible for purchase under this chapter"). Although Congress' instruction was clear,
Treasury acted more quickly to provide TARP funds to the largest banks. See supra notes
148-153 and accompanying text.
2012]
HA MLINE LA W REVIEW
door approaches that deflect public scrutiny and provide little in the way of
accountability.
280
The FHFA as conservator should adopt a broad policy of disclosure
to allow public evaluation of its loss-shifting decisions.281 In particular, the
FHFA should disclose the sources of its loan purchases and its guarantee
fees, including how those fees differ depending on the number of mortgages
purchased and the identity of the seller. The FHFA should also disclose
enough information regarding its settlements of mortgage repurchase re-
quests and securities claims to allow for a meaningful evaluation of the bene-
fit provided to each bank that receives a settlement. Such disclosures intro-
duce a level of accountability into FHFA decision making that is currently
lacking.
V. CONCLUSION
For the last three years, the FHFA has operated under mandates to
stabilize the mortgage market and return the Enterprises to financial health.
So far, the result has been less than impressive. The Enterprises continue to
require infusions of government capital,282 and the housing market is still far
283from healthy. Moreover, the FHFA's conflicting mandates encourage the
Enterprises to shift losses to smaller banks while absorbing losses that could
be passed on to large banks, potentially exacerbating the problem of banks
that are too big to fail. At the same time, FHFA labors in obscurity. Because
the FHFA does not disclose much information about its decisions, it is diffi-
cult to determine whether the FHFA strikes the appropriate balance between
affordable housing and Enterprise health. The FHFA should adopt disclosure
policies to allow the public to evaluate the benefits and burdens passed from
Fannie and Freddie to commercial banks.
280 When the Enterprises were funded by purely private investment, it may have
been appropriate for the Enterprises to conceal proprietary information in order to compete
with other private companies.
28 Nothing precludes the FHFA from adopting more fulsome disclosures on its
own. This approach is preferable because disclosures could begin almost immediately. How-
ever, if the FHFA is slow to adopt disclosures, Congress should pass legislation requiring the
FHFA to disclose a broad array of information when operating as conservator.
282 See Jeff Clabaugh, Freddie Mac Seeks Another $1.5B, WASH. Bus. J., Aug. 9,
2011, available at 2011 WLNR 15746209 (noting that Fannie had also recently announced it
would need $5.1 billion).
283 See Nick Timiraos, The Outlook: Economic Rx: More Refinancing, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 6, 2011, at A2.
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